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Q. Discuss the rules of statutary interpretation with the help of decided cases. Explain - Literal Rule, Mischief Rule (aka Rule in Haydons case!, "olden Rule, Rule of Har#onious $onstruction, %osciur a sociis, E&usde# 'eneris, Reddendo sin'ul sin'uis. tate the circu#stances when these rules are applied )y the courts. *ntroduction Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying legislation to decide cases. Interpretation is necessary when case involves suble or ambiguous aspects of a statute. Generally, Generally, the words of a statute have a plain and straightforward straightforward meaning. But in some cases, there may be ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. The reason for ambiguity or vagueness of a legislation is the fundamental nature of language. It is not always possible to precisely transform the intention of the legislature into written words. Interpreting a statute to determine whether it applies to a given set of facts often boils down to analyzing whether a single word or short phrase covers some element of the factual situation before the judge. The epansiveness epansiveness of language necessarily necessarily means that there there will often often be e!ually good or e!ually unconvincing arguments arguments for two competing interpretations. " judge is then forced to resort to documentation of legislative intent, which may also be unhelpful, and then finally to his or her own judgment of o f what outcome is ultimately fair and logical under the totality of the circumstances.To circumstances.To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative legislative history, and purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation to legislation enacted by the legislature or to delegated legislation such as administrative administrative agency regulations. #ver time, various methods of statutory interpretation and construction have fallen in and out of f avor. Some Some of the important rules of statutary interpretation are$ %. +ri#ary Rules %. Literal Rule &a'a Rule &a'a +lain Meanin' Rule( Rule ( ) It means that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute unless a statute eplicitly defines some of its terms otherwise. In other words, the law must be read, word for word, and it should not divert from its true meaning.
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Mischief rule ) rule ) This rule attempts to determine the legislator+s intention. #riginating #riginating from a %th century case in the -nited ingdom, its main aim is to determine the /mischief and defect/ that the statute in !uestion has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. #ith s. Hu'hes /012 3 4ll E.R. 56/
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"olden rule ) rule ) It is a compromise between the plain meaning &or literal( rule and the mischief rule. 1i'e the plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. 2owever, 2owever, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unli'ely to be the legislature+s intention, the judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning. If the word only has one meaning, and applying this meaning would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.
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Rule of Har#onious $onstruction ) when there are two provisions in a statute, which are in conflict with each other, they should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and the construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted ecept in the last resort. 7en'al i##unity $o. s. tate of 7ihar (/66! 0 8$ 990 ($!. ($! .
econdary Rules aka Rules of Lan'ua'e %.
%oscitur a sociis ) sociis ) 4hen a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
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E&usde# "eneris ) "eneris ) 4hen a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them e.g. vehicles in /cars,motor bi'es,motor powered vehicles/ would be interpreted in a limited sense and therefore cannot be interpreted as including air planes.
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Reddendo in'ula in'ulis ) 4hen a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last word, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital. 2ere,/in a hospital/ only applies to doctors and not to firemen or policemen.
Literal Rule " statues statues often contains a /definitions/ section, section, which eplicitly eplicitly defines the the most important terms used in that that statute. 2owever, 2owever, some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or fail to define a particular term. The literal rule, which is also 'nown as the plain meaning rule, attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself. "ccording to this rule, when a word does not contain any definition in a statute, it must be given its plain, ordinary, and and literal meaning. If the word is clear, it must be applied, even though the intention of the legislature may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means. This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges are not supposed to legislate. "s there is always the danger that a particular interpretation interpretation may be the e!uivalent of ma'ing law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law+s literal wording. 4hen the words of a Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of conse!uences. In :.+. 7ansal . tate of Ra&asthan 311;, S5 observed
that the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. "s a conse!uence, a construction which re!uires for its support, addition, substitution, or removal of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. This is accordance with the case of $rawford s pooner, 590, where privy council noted that the courts cannot aid the legislature+s defective phrasing of an "ct, they cannot add or mend, and by construction ma'e up for deficiencies which are left there. In
:oshi s M > hi#pi, 4*R /0 , relating to 7ood and "dulteration "ct, it was contented that the act does not apply to butter made from curd. 2owever, S5 held that the word butter in the said act is plain and clear and there is no need to interpret it differently. Butter is butter whether made from mil' or curd. Thus, when the language of a provision is plain and clear, court cannot enlarge the scope of the provision by interpretive process. 7urther, a construction which re!uires for its support addition of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided 4danta'es %. 8roponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from ta'ing sides in legislative or political issues. *. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have etensive access to secondary sources and thus depending on the ordinary meaning of the words is the safest route. 0. It encourages precision in drafting. Disadanta'es %. #pponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a fied meaning. 4ords are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. 2owever, since little else is offered as an alternative discretion)confining theory, plain meaning survives. *. Sometimes the use of the literal rule may defeat the intention of 8arliament. 7or instance, in the case of ?hiteley s $happel (505@ LR 9 Q7 9=!, the court came to the reluctant conclusion that 4hiteley could not be convicted of impersonating /any person entitled to vote/ at an election, because the person he impersonated was dead. -sing a literal construction of the relevant statutory provision, the deceased was not /a person entitled to vote./ This, surely, could not have been the intention of 8arliament. 2owever, the literal rule does not ta'e into account the conse!uences of a literal interpretation, only whether words have a clear meaning that ma'es sense within that contet. If 8arliament does not li'e the literal interpretation, then it must amend the legislation. 0.
It obliges the courts to fall bac' on standard common law principles of statutory interpretation. 1egislation is drawn up with these principles in mind. 2owever, these principles may not be appropriate to constitutional interpretation, which by its nature tends to lay down general principles. It is said that it seems wrong to parcel the 5onstitution as if it were a 7inance "ct.
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5learly, the literal approach has another disadvantage in that one judge9s literal interpretation might be very different from another9s. 5asey says$ :4hat may seem plain to one judge may seem perverse and unreal to another.;
<. It ignores the limitations of language. .
To place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship.
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6udges have tended ecessively to emphasise the literal meaning of statutory provisions without giving due weight to their meaning in wider contets.
Mischief Rule The >ischief ?ule is used by judges in statutory interpretation in order to discover legislature+s intention. It essentially as's the !uestion$ By creating an "ct of 8arliament what was the /mischief/ that the previous or eisting law did not cover and this act covers. This rule was developed by Lord $oke in ir :ohn Heydons $ase, 659, where it was stated that there were four points to be ta'en into consideration when interpreting a statute$ %. 4hat was the common law before the ma'ing of the act@ *. 4hat was the /mischief or defect/ for which the common law did not provide@ 0.
4hat remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth@
3. 4hat is the true reason of the remedy@ The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on 8arliament+s intent. 1egislative intent is determined by eamining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. The rule was further illustrated in the case of #ith Hu'hes, /01, where under the Street #ffences "ct %Aiss 8ic'stone claimed that the wor' of the warehouse operatives was of e!ual value to that done by male warehouse chec'ers who were paid F%.** per wee' more than they were. The employers argued that a woman warehouse operative was employed on li'e wor' to the male warehouse operatives, so she could not bring a claim under section %&*( &c( of the %A=C statute for wor' of e!ual value. This was a literal interpretation of the %A=C statute. The 2ouse of 1ords decided that the literal approach would have left the -nited ingdom in breach of its treaty obligations to give effect to an D- directive. It therefore used the purposive approach and stated that >iss 8ic'stone was entitled to claim on the basis of wor' of e!ual value even though there was a male employee doing the same wor' as her. %oscitur a ociis oscere means to 'now and sociis means association. Thus, oscitur a Sociis means 'nowing from association. Thus, under the doctrine of /noscitur a sociis/ the !uestionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words within the contet of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are related to each other. If multiple words having similar meaning are put together, they are to be understood in their collective meaning. "ccording to >awell, /this rule means that when two or more words susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They ta'e as it were their colour from each o ther, i.e. the more general is restricted to a sense analoguous to a less general/. This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of e&usde# 'eneris because this rule puts the words in contet of the whole phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words. The language of the phrase can be used as a guide to arrive at the true meaning of the word. This rule is illustrated in Aoster Diphwys $asson (55=! 5 Q7D 935, involving a statute which stated that eplosives ta'en into a mine must be in a /case or canister/. 2ere the defendant used a cloth bag. The courts had to consider whether a cloth bag was within the definition. -nder oscitur a sociis, it was held that the bag could not have been within the statutory definition, because parliament+s intention was refering to a case or container of the same strength as a canister. In tate of 4ssa# s R Muha##ad 4*R /0=, S5 made use of this rule to arrive at the meaning of the word /posting/ used in "rticle *00 &%( of the 5onstitution. It held that since the word /posting/ occurs in association with the words /appointment/ and /promotion/, it too' its colour from them and so it means /assignment of an appointee or a promotee to a position/ and does not mean transfer of a person from one station to another. oscitur a sociis is only a rule of construction and it cannot be used when it is clear that the word with wider meaning is deliberately used in order to increase the scope. It can only be used when the intention of the legislature in using a word with wider sense along with the words with narrower meaning is not clear. 7urther, this rule can only be used when the associated words have analogous meaning. It cannot be used when the words have disjoint meanings. 7or eample, in the case of Lok#at %ewspapers s hankarprasad 4*R ///, it was held that the words /discharge/ and /dismissal/ do not have the same analogous meaning and so this rule cannot be applied. E&usde# "eneris The ejusdem generis, or Hof the same genus9 rule, is similar though narrower than the more general rule of noscitur a sociis. It operates where a broad or open)ended term appears following a series of more restrictive terms in the tet of a statute. 4here the terms listed are similar enough to constitute a class or genus, the courts will presume, in interpreting the general words that follow, that they are intended to apply only to things of the same genus as the particular items listed. "ccording to this rule, when particular words pertaining to a class or a genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to the things of the same 'ind as those specified by the class or the genus. The meaning of an epression with wider meaning is limited to the meaning of the preceeding specific epressions. 2owever, for this rule to apply, the preceeding words must for a specific
class or genus. 7urther, this rule cannot be applied in the words with a wider meaning appear before the words with specific or narrow meaning. In B+ tate Electricity 7oard s Harishankar, 4*R /=/, S5 held that the following conditions must eist for the application of this rule ) %. *. 0. 3. <.
The statue contains an The subject of the enumeration The class or category is " general term is present There is no indication
enumeration of constitute a class not ehausted by at the end of of a different
specific words or a category the enumeration the enumeration legislative intent
:ustice Hidayatullah eplained the principles of this rule through the following eample ) In the epression, /boo's, pamphlets, newspapers, and other documents/, private letters may not be held included if /other documents/ be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads, /newspapers or other documents li'ely to convey secrets to the enemy/, the words /other documents/ would include documents of any 'ind and would not ta'e their meaning from newspaper. This was also illustrated in the case of *shwar in'h 7a''a s tate of Ra&asthan /5= , where the words /other person/, in the epression /any police officer authorized in this behalf or any other person authorized in this behalf by the State government/ in Section %*A of >otor ehicles "ct, were held not to be interpreted ejusdem generis because the mention of a single species of /police officers/ does not constitute a genus. It can be seen that this rule is an eception to the rule of construction that general words should be given their full and natural meaning. It is a canon of construction li'e many other rules that are used to understand the intention of the legislature. This rule also covers 8he rank principle, which goes as follows ) 4here a string of items of a certain ran' or level is followed by general residuary words, it is presumed that the residuary words are not intended to include items of a higher ran' than those specified. By specifiying only items of lower ran' the impression is created that higher ran's are not intened to be covered. If they were, then their mention would be epected a fortiori. 7or eample, the phrase /tradesman, artificer, wor'man, labourer, or other person whatsoever/ was held not to include persons above the artisan class. Similarly, the phrase /copper, brass, pewter, and tin, and all other metals/ in a local "ct of %E*< was held not to include precious metals such as gold and silver. Reddendo in'ula in'ulis The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. 4here a comple sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right construction to render each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. " similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of speech. " typical application of this principle is where a testator says +I devise and be!ueath all my real and personal property to B+. The term devise is appropriate only to real property. The term be!ueath is appropriate only to personal property. "ccordingly, by the application of the principle reddendo singula singulis, the testamentary disposition is read as if it were worded +I devise all my real property, and be!ueath all my personal property, to B+. This rule has been applied in the case of ittal enkatara#ana Dearu >s tate of Mysore, 4*R /65 . In that case the Supreme 5ourt applied the rule to resolve conflict between 4rticle 36 (3!()! and 30 ()! of the 5onstitution. It was held that the right of every religious denomination or any Section thereof to manage its own affairs in matter of religion is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of 2indu religious institution of a public character to all classes and sections of 2indus. "rticle *<. &%( Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this 8art, all persons are e!ually entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. &*( othing in this article shall affect the operation of any eisting law or prevent the State from ma'ing any lawJ &a( regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practiceK &b( providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of 2indu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of 2indus.
"rticle *. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the rightJ &a( to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposesK &b( to manage its own affairs in matters of religionK &c( to own and ac!uire movable and immovable propertyK and &d( to administer such property in accordance with law. In tate of "u&arat >s. Ra#&i 7hai, 4*R /=/ Supreme 5ourt ta'ing note of the principle observed as follows$ : Generalia Specialibus non derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that the gene ral provisions must always yield to the special provisions. 5onstrued in accordance with this fundamental principle, the special class of u nregistered dealer covered by Section 00 &( must be ta'en to have b een ecluded from the purview of the general provisions in Section 0<. Thus considered, it is clear that the case of an unregistered dealer who evades ta by committing the double default specified in Section 00&(, action can be ta'en only under that Section and not under Section 0<;. Thus, it is well settled that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is ecluded from the general provision. In the event of conflict between a general and a special provision, the latter must prevail. ifferently stated the principle is that general words in a Statute should not be held to repeal or rip up a specific provision upon a particular matter. " general rule though stated in wide terms must be ta'en to be not interfering with matters covered by a special provision. In outh *ndia $orporation (+! Ltd. >s ecretary, 7oard of Reenue, 8riendru# 4*R /09 , it was held that the general provision under 4rticle ;=3 of the 5onstitution regarding continuance of eisting laws is subject to 4rticle 3== of the 5onstitution, which is a special provision relating to taes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the 5onstitution. In this regard, the Supreme 5ourt observed as follows$) :4ith this bac'ground let u now consider the following two !uestions raised before us$ &i( whether "rticle 0=* of the 5onstitution is subject to "rticle *== thereofK and &ii( whether "rticle 0=* is subject to "rticle *=E thereof. "rticle 0=* is a general provision9K and "rticle *== is a special provision. It is settled law that special provision should be given effect to the etent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply. The earlier discussion ma'es it abundantly clear that the constitution gives a separate treatment to the subject of finance and "rticle *== saves the eisting taes etc. levied by states, if the conditions mentioned therein are complied with. 4hile "rticle 0=* saves all pre)5onstitution valid laws, "rticle *== is confined only to taes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before the 5onstitution. Therefore, "rticle 0=* cannot be construed in such a way as to enlarge the scope of the savings of taes, duties, cesses or fees. To state it differently, "rticle 0=* must be read subject to "rticle *==. 4e have already held that an agreement can be entered into between the -nion and the States in terms of "rticle *=E abrogating or modifying the power preserved to the State under "rticle *==;.
In "u&arat tate $o-operatie Land Deelop#ent 7ank >s +.R. Mankad, (/=/! , the Supreme 5ourt applying the maim generalia specialibus non)derogant held that a general provision must yield to the special provision. Lord Ho)house in 7arker >s Ed'ar (5/5! 4$ =9/ opined that when the legislature had given its consent to a separate subject and made p rovision for it, the presumption is that a subse!uent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly.
Bt res #a'is aleat Cua# pereat 1iteral meaning ) Such a construction is to be made that lets the thing have effect rather than let it fail. "'a ?ule of Dffectiveness. 4tar in'h s tate of +un&a), 4*R /66 $ 1= 00 ) "ppellant was convicted of theft of electricity under Section 0A of Dlectricity "ct, %AAC. 2e contented that the proceeding were illegal because they were not initiated by any of the persons as mandated by Section unicipal "ct, %A<%, no person shall without a license granted by the 5orporation of 5alcutta, 'eep open any cinema house for public amusement in 5alcutta. -nder s. <3E&*(, for every license under the "ct, a fee may be charged at such rate as may from time to time be fied by the 5orporation. In %A3E, the appellant &5orporation( fied fees on the basis of annual valuation of the cinema house. The respondent, who was the owner and licensee of a cinema theater, had been paying a license fee of ?s. 3CC per year on that basis. In %Audhol'ar 66( $ &i( The was not a fee but a ta. The word /fee/ in s. <3E must be read as referring to a ta as any other reading would ma'e the section invalid, and in interpreting a statute, it ought to be made valid if possible. expressu# facit cessare tacitu# That which is epressed ma'es that which is implied to cease &that is, supersedes it, or controls its effect(. Thus, an implied covenant in a deed is in all cases controlled by an epress covenant. 4here a law sets down plainly its whole meaning the court is prevented from ma'ing it mean what the court pleases.
Q. ?hat do you understand )y 7eneficial $onstruction Explain the state#ent, 7eneficial construction is a tendency rather than a rule. " general rule of interpretation is that if a word used in a statute ecludes certain cases in its common meaning, it should not be constrained unnecessarily to include those cases. "n eception to this rule is that when the objectives of the statute are not met by ecluding the cases, then the word may be interpreted etensively so as to include those cases. 2owever, when a word is ambiguous i.e. if it has multiple meanings, which meaning should be understood by that word@ This is the predicament that is resolved by the principle of Beneficial 5onstruction. 4hen a statute is meant for the benefit of a particular class, and if a word in the statute is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefits and one which would not, then the meaning that preserves the benefit must be adopted. It is important to note that omissions will not be supplied by the court. #nly when multiple meanings are possible, can the court pic' the beneficial one. Thus, where the court has to choose between a wider mean that carries out the objective of the legislature better and a narrow meaning, then it usually chooses the former. Similarly, when the language used by the legislature fails to achieve the objective of a statute, an etended meaning could be given to it to achieve that objective, if the language is fairly susceptible to the etended meaning. This is !uite evident in the case of 7 hah s +residin' Ffficer, 4*R /=5, where Section < of >aternity Benefits "ct, %A% was is !uestion, where an epectant mother could ta'e %* wee's of maternity leave on full salary. In this case, a women who used to wor' days a wee' was paid for only %*L=* days instead of =%*LE3 days. S5 held that the words %* wee's were capable of two meanings and one meaning was beneficial to the woman. Since it is a beneficial legislation, the meaning that gives more benefit to the woman must be used.
It is said by >"M4D11, that Beneficial 5onstruction is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is that this principle is based on human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the people from getting the benefit of the statute, 5ourt tends to include as many classes as it can while remaining faithful to the wordings of the statute. 7or eample, in the case of 4le#)ic $he#ical ?orks s ?ork#en 4*R /0, an industrial tribunal awarded more number of paid leaves to the wor'ers than what Section =A&%( of 7actories "ct recommended. This was challenged by the appellant. S5 held that the enactment being a welfare legislation for the wor'ers, it had to be beneficially constructed in the favor of wor'er and thus, if the words are capable of two meanings, the one that gives benefit to the wor'ers must be used. Similarly, in B Bnichoyi s tate of inimum 4ages "ct, %A3E is violative of "rticle %A &%( &g( of the constitution because the act did not define what is minimum wage and did not ta'e into account the capacity of the employer to pay. It was held that the act is a beneficial legislation and it must be construed in favor of the wor'er. In an under developed country where unemployment is rampant, it is possible that wor'ers may become ready to wor' for etremely low wages but that should not happen. Q. ?hat do you understand )y trict $onstruction *f there is an a#)i'uity in a word in a penal statute, what interpretation should )e 'ien and why Explain why a taxin' statute should )e strictly constructed trict $onstruction Strict construction refers to a particular legal philosophy of judicial interpretation that limits or restricts judicial interpretation. Strict construction re!uires the court to apply the tet as it is written and no further, once the meaning of the tet has been ascertained. That is, court should avoid drawing inference from a statute or constitution. It is important to note that court may ma'e a construction only if the language is ambiguous or unclear. If the language is plain and clear, a judge must apply the plain meaning of the language and cannot consider other evidence that would change the meaning. If, however, the court finds that the words produce absurdity, ambiguity, or a literalness never intended, the plain meaning does not apply and a construction may be made. Strict construction occurs when ambiguous language is given its eact and technical meaning, and no other e!uitable considerations or reasonable implications are made. Strict construction is the opposite of liberal construction, which permits a term to be reasonably and fairly evaluated so as to implement the object and purpose of the document. 4pplica)ility in +enal tatutes " 8enal Statute must be constructed strictly. This means that a criminal statute may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used or the meaning that is reasonably justified by its terms. It is fundamentally important in a free and just society that 1aw must be readily ascertainable and reasonably clear otherwise it is oppressive and deprives the citizen of one of his basic rights. "n imprecise law can cause unjustified convictions because it would not be possible for the accused to defend himself against uncertainties. Therefore, an accused can be punished only if his act falls clearly into the four
corners of the law without resorting to any special meaning or interpretation of the law. 7or eample, in eksaria $otton Mills s tate of 7o#)ay, /69, S5 held that in a penal statute, it is the duty of the 5ourts to interpret the words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they do not become traps for honest unlearned and unwary men. If there is honest and substantial compliance with an array of puzzling directions that should be enough, even if on some hyper critical view of the law other ingenious meanings can be devised. If a penal provision is capable of two reasonably possible constructions, then the one that eempts the accused from penalty must be used rather than the one that does not. 4hether a particular construction achieves the intention of the statute or not is not up to the court to thin' about in case of penal statutes. It is not apt for the court to etend the scope of a mischief and to enlarge the penalty. It is not competent for the court to etend the meaning of the words to achieve the intention of the legislature. If a penal provision allows accused to go scot)free because of ambiguity of the law, then it is the duty of the legislature and not of the courts to fi the law. -nless the words of a statute clearly ma'e an act criminal, it cannot be construed as criminal. $hinu)hai s tate of 7o#)ay, 4*R /01, is an important case in this respect. In this case, several wor'ers in a factory died by inhaling poisonous gas when they entered into a pit in the factory premises to stop the lea'age of the gas from a machine. The !uestion was whether the employer violated section 0 of the 7actories "ct, which says that no person in any factory shall be permitted to enter any confined space in which dangerous fumes are li'ely to be present. The Supreme 5ourt, while construing the provision strictly, held that the section does not impose an absolute duty on the employer to prevent wor'ers from going into such area. It further observed that the fact that some wor'ers were present in the confined space does not prove that the employer permitted them to go there. The prosecution must first prove that the wor'ers were permitted to enter the space to convict the accused.
4pplica)ility in 8axin' tatutes Ta is the money collected from the people for the purposes of public wor's. It is a source of revenue for the government. It is the right of the govt to collect ta according to the provisions of the law. o ta can be levied or collected ecept by the authority of law. In general, legislature enjoys wide discretion in the matter of taing statutes as long as it satisfies the fundamental principle of classification as enshrined in "rticle %3. " person cannot be taed unless the language of the statute unambiguously imposes the obligation without straining itself. In that sense, there is no reason why a taing statute must be interpreted any differently from any other 'ind of statute. Indeed, S5, in the case of $*8 s hahaGada %and and ons, /00, observed that the underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous epression used therein rather than any notions which be entertained by the 5ourts as to what is just or epedient. In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. "ll that the court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. 1ord ?ussel in 4ttorney "eneral s $alton 7an, /5/, illustrated categorically as, /I see no reason why special canons of construction should be applied to any act of parliament and I 'now of no authority for saying that a taing statute is to be construed differently from any other act./ 2owever, as with any statute, a fiscal or taing statute is also susceptible to human errors and impreciseness of the language. This may cause ambiguity or vagueness in its provisions. It is in such cases, the tas' of constructing a statute becomes open to various methods of construction. Since a person is compulsorily parted from his money due to ta, imposition of a ta is considered a type of imposition of a penalty, which can be imposed only if the language of the provision une!uivocally says so. This means that a taing statute must be strictly constructed. The principle of strict interpretation of taing statutes was best enunciated by ?owlatt 6. in his classic statement in $ape 7randy yndicate *.R.$. ) /In a taing statute one has to loo' merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intention. There is no e!uity about a ta. There is no presumption as to a ta. othing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. #ne can loo' fairly at the language used./ If by any reasonable meaning of the words, it is possible to avoid the ta, then that meaning must be chosen. There is no scope for any inference or induction in constructing a taing statute. There is no room for suppositions as to :spirit; of the law or by way of :inference;. 4hen the provision is reasonably open to only one meaning then it is not open to restrictive construction on the ground that the levy of ta, is oppressive , disproportionate, unreasonable or would cause hardship. There is no room for such speculation. The language must be eplicit. Similarly, penalty provision in a taing statute has to be specifically provided and cannot be inferred. In 4. >. Aernandes s tate of aharashtra passed Bombay 8rohibition "ct that prohibited the sale and storage of li!uor. This affected the business of the appellant who used to import li!uor. 2e challenged the act on the ground that import and eport are the subjects that belong in -nion list and state is incapable of ma'ing any laws regarding it. S5 rejected this argument and held that the true nature of the act is prohibition of alcohol in the state and this subject belongs to the State list. The court loo's at the true character and nature of the act having regard to the purpose, scope, objective, and the effects of its provisions. Therefore, the fact that the act superficially touches on import of alcohol does not ma'e it invalid. Thus, as held in tate of ? 7en'al s an of the act write it. #ther means of when Statutory interpretations would be needed is when rafting errors are present in the bill, this happens mostly when bills a re rushed in times of emergency. +ro)le#s of interpretin' statutes The problems with interpreting statues is that 6udges have to decide what parliament meant by a particular piece of legislation. In most cases judges correctly judge of what the intentions of parliament was at the time of passing the law and whether it still applies in the present time. 2owever, as you with all methods there are disadvantages. 6udges can often miss)interpret the act or legislation. #ther factors which may arise as a problem is their ruling must abide with the 2uman ?ights "ct and Duropean 1aw. This may lead to laws not being applied by which parliament intended as it contradicts higher laws which may not have been present at the time of the passing of legislation. How &ud'es deal with pro)le#s of statutory interpretation i.
+resu#ptions
" judge begins by assuming certain things. These will be ta'en to be true unless a good argument is given to demonstrate that the presumption should not apply. These presumptions are$ Q
That the law has not been changed R unless the act shows a clear intention to change itK
Q
That mens rea is re!uired in criminal casesK
Q That parliament has not changed the law Hretrospectively9 &that the stature does not affect past acts, to ma'e illegal something that was legal at the time it was done(. ii.
+resu#ptions of lan'ua'eI
Q Ejusdem generis &of the same 'ind( R general words following particular words are of the same class$ &for eample, Htradesman, wor'man, labourer or other person whatsoever9 will only cover person o f a similar type(. In the case
of +owell
