Paper In Australian Maritime Affairs Number 05

Transcript

Papers in Australian Maritime Affair s Na y edited by David Wilso n 1 Royal Australian Nav y Maritime Studies Program Issues in Regional Maritim e Strateg y Papers by Foreign Visiting Militar y Fellows with the Royal Australian Nav y Maritime Studies Program - 199 8  dited by  avid Wilson Royal Australian Nav y Maritime Studies Progra m Papers in Australian Maritime Affai r s Number Fir e October 199 8 General Editor David Steven s Editor David Wilso n The 'Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs' series is a vehicle for the distribution o f substantial work by members of the Royal Australian Navy as well as members of th e Australian and international community undertaking original research into regional maritim e issues . Papers will be drawn generally from manuscripts not scheduled for publicatio n elsewhere but that nonetheless merit extensive distribution. Candidates are considered by a n editorial board under the auspices of the Director General Maritime Studies Program . The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and should not b e taken to represent any official policy or position , All correspondence concerning 'Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs' includin g requests for additional copies or permanent distribution should be directed to : Maritime Studies Progra m Department of Defence (Navy ) APW2-G-1 1 Canberra ACT 260 0 Australi a ISSN 1327-565 8 ISI3N 06 .4229509 3 Other volumes in the series are : No . 1 From Empi e Defence to the Long Haul : Post-our def e nce pnlicr and its impact o n natal force .st ucture planning 1945- 1955, by Hector Donohu e No . 2 No Easy Answers: The Development of the,bavies of India, Pakistun, Banglades h and Sri Lanka 1945—1996_ by James Goldric k No . 3 Coastal Shipping : The Vital Link, by Mary Gante r No . 4 Australian Currier Deci .sion .s : The Decisions to Procure H :'h1,4 Ships Albatross , Sydney and Melbourne . by Anthony Wright Forew'or( I Since its formation in 1990, the RAN Maritime Studies Program (MSP) ha s contributed significantly to the discussion and awareness of maritime strategy an d more broadly to issues in maritime policy through lectures. seminars . conferences an d study periods and a substantial publishing program . The MSP has established an d maintained close links with many navies, academic and defence institutions aroun d the world and has gained a respected international reputation for its contribution t o maritime affairs . In furthering its contribution to the understandin g of regional maritime affair s and regional security the MSP has acted as host for visitors from regional navies wh o are undertaking research activities in Australia . While the nature of this researc h relates to contemporary domestic issues . any discussion of the sea attracts the interes t of all actors in the region. The benefits of the NISI' visiting fellows program to bot h the RAN and the regional countries concerned are enormous . The RAN gets firs t hand exposure to the issues affecting our regional neighbours and the visiting fellow s share in the knowledge and experience of one of the more mature maritime nations i n the region . The two papers presented in this, the fifth publication in the NISP's 'Papers i n Australian Maritime Affair s ' series, represent maritime issues of significance not onl y to the countries concerned, but also to the world in general . I con g ratulate the author s on this work and recommend these papers as a valuable addition to the discussion o f maritime affairs . J . Scarce CS C Commodore. RA N Commander Training - Navy iii L1 Iron Paciti u iv Content s Foreword   Commodore K . .1 . Scarce CSC, RA N Contents  Figures and Tables  i Illustrations  i i Abbreviations  ii i Introduction   x Lieutenant Commander David Wilson, RAN The Malacca Straits : A Special Area Under MARPOL 73/78?   Sulistiyant o Development of a Philippine Maritime Surveillance Capability   7 Edgar L . Abogado & Reynaldo L . Yom a Note : The authors are members of their respective navies and have extensive experience i n maritime surveillance, patrol and response operations . v Figures and Table s The Malacca Straits : A Special Area Under MARPOI, 73178 ? Figure I .  The Strait of Malacca  Figure 2 .  The Bosphorous and Dardenalles Straits  1 1 Figure 3 .  The inner route through the Great Barrier Reef  5 Table 1 .  Special Areas designated under MARPOL 73/78  7 Figures 1 and 3 sourced from US Defence , :lapping Atencr rind Figure 2 from 'Peters Atlas of the tV'orld ' courtesy of Oxford Cartographers . Os/Ord UK . Development of a Philippine Maritime Surveillance Capabilit y Figure 1 . Traffic Densities for Strategic Routes Through the South China Sea  8 Figure 2 . Sources of Marine Oil Pollution  4 Figure 3 . Philippine Maritime Areas  5 Figure 4 . Existing Coastwatch Stations  1 Figure Cl . NMSCRO Organisation  ( 1 Figure C2 . National Surveillance program and Budget  4 Table I . Emerging Asian Oil Import Rivalry  1 Table 2 . Status of Philippine Coral Reefs .. .!  3 Table 3 . The EEZ Balance Sheet  7 Table B l . Government Agency Equipment Acquisitions  7 Figures 1 .? and 4 charts soul red from ( . :S Dejencr Wapping .4 gran . .v v i Illustration s MV Iron Pacific  v Chinese merchant vessel in the Malacca Strait  Oil rig in the South China Sea  MV BP Achiever  8 Russian merchant vessel in the Malacca Strait  5 Philippine corvette BRP Artemio Ricarte  6 Philippine coastal patrol craft BRP Jose Loot- Sr  2 Australian patrol boat HMAS Warrnambool  3 Philippine corvette BRP Pangasinan  8 Merchant ship in the South China Sea  5 vii Abbreviation s AFP  Armed Forces of the Philippine s ANCA  Australian National Conservation Agenc y APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperatio n ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nation s BAKORKAMLA Coordinating Board for Maritime Securit y BEAR  Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource s BUCUS  Bureau of Custom CCMOA  Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affair s CSCAP  Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c DA  Department of Agricultur e DF,NR  Department of Environmental and Natural Resource s DII .G  Department of Interior and Local Governmen t DND  Department of National Defenc e DOTC  Department of Transport and Communication s EEZ  exclusive economic zon e GBR  Great Barrier Ree f GBRMP  Great Barrier Reef Marine Par k IAC  Interdepartmental Advisory Committe e IMO  International Maritime Organisatio n LEO  low earth orbi t LOSC  Law of the Sea Conventio n LWR  land-based microwave rada r MARICOM  Maritime Comman d MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ship s MECC  Maritime Enforcement Coordination Committe e MEPC  Marine Environment Protection Committe e MPA  marine protected are a MSC  Maritime Safety Committe e MTW  Malaysian Territorial Water s NMSRCO  National Maritime Surveillance and Response Coordination Offic e OHTR  over-the-horizon rada r OPAC  Operations and Program Advisory Committe e OPAG  Operations and Program Advisory Grou p PAF  Philippine Air Forc e PNG  Papua New Guine a PNP  Philippine National Polic e RAAF  Royal Australian Air Forc e RAN  Royal Australian Nav y SLAR  side-looking airborne rada r STWC  Standards of Trauiung . Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarer s SWR  surface wave rada r TSS  traffic separation schem e TTEG  Tripartite Technical Expert Grou p VTS  vessel traffic services Introductio n Lieutenant Commander David Wilson, RA N The two papers presented here discuss important maritime issues, which hav e relevance to not only the regions discussed, but to the world in general . In particular , protection of the marine environment is gaining widespread acceptance as a task tha t requires action sooner rather than later if the trends of the past century are to be halted and , if possible, reversed . That fact that developing countries are beginning to address thes e issues, albeit from a national perspective rather than a global one, is encouraging . It i s incumbent upon the developed nations of the world to lead the way, not only by providin g the support required by the developing nations, but by ensuring they are addressing th e issues themselves . Far too often we have seen important global issues being sidetracked b y the nationalistic concerns of some nations . Both papers have particular relevance to Australia . The Malacca Strait is the secon d busiest waterway in the world ' and an important trade route for Australia . ' In addition, th e Malacca Strait is exceedingly important, both economically and socially, to two o f Australia's nearest neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia . Therefore it is in Australia' s interest to assist these countries to protect and regulate these waters . Indeed Australia' s experience in protecting and regulating the marine environment is an example that can be o f benefit to these countries . The significance of the Malacca Straits to the world econom y dictates that there should be global interest in this issue . Philippine efforts to develop a credible surveillance capability is a logical outcome o f the increasing awareness of the importance of the marine environment to all facets of a nations well-being . With the increased jurisdictions and the associated management an d enforcement requirements resulting from the Law of the Sea Convention many nation s around the world, and in the South East Asian region in particular, are now facing thi s issue . Australia has one of the largest maritime environments in the world, and although i t has a significant surveillance capability, it is by no means ideal, and any efforts by othe r countries to develop a capability in an era dominated by the outcomes of the Law of the Se a Convention should be looked upon with interest . 1 .  J .H . Noer, Chokepoints : Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia, Nationa l Defence University Press Washington DC, 1996, p 2 ibid ., p67 ix Chinese merchant vessel in the Malacca Strai t (Courtesy of 92 Wing Royal Australian Air Force) THE MALACCA STRAITS : A SPECIAL AREA UNDER MARPO L 73/78 ? Sulistivunt o Introductio n A century ago T. H. Huxley, one of the leading scientists of the British Empir e denounced as absurd the notion that humans could have a significant, wide spread impac t upon the marine environment . ' In 1952 the United Nations in the one of its earliest action s established the Law of the Sea process, in part, to address the now recognised need t o manage the sea, particularly its resources and environmental quality. There were severa l reasons for this, including : the recognition that the increasing range and efficiency of fishin g fleets made it increasingly possible to over-exploit fish populations : identification of sea be d and sub-sea mineral and petroleum deposits and the technology development to exploi t them commercially ; and closer to land: awareness of estuarine damage and declining wate r quality resulting from of increasing use marine and estuarine environments and resources . Development in the 211th century has banished the innocence of the late 19t h century . Wide spread and increasing impact on the marine environment has followed th e growth in human population and unsustainahle uses of technology . A major global challeng e today is to develop and apply the means to halt then reverse these impacts . Failure to do so , will increase the pattern of collapsing marginal and wild stock fisheries, while increase d pollution and degradation of the coastal margin will foreclose options for sea farming . Th e social and economic cost will be high, particularly in developing countries which rely o n protein from sea to feed their populations . Maintaining, protecting and restoring th e productivity of coastal and marine environments are critical to the long-term resourc e security of many nations . The decline in fishery production and environmental degradation is now a globa l trend, particularly among developing countries, with Indonesia being no exception . On e specific area identified as highly susceptible to damage due to pollution is the Strait o f Malacca . Aside from being one of the busiest sea routes for international traffic, this body o f water is a primary source of livelihood for the local coastal communities . The risk o f environmental damage is high and thus it requires special and careful consideration . With respect to operational pollution by oil, noxious liquid substances in bulk , sewage and garbage, uniform global discharge standards have been developed in th e International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 1973, a s modified by the Protocol of 1978 IMARPOL 73/7X1 . Regulations covering the variou s sources of ship-generated pollution are contained in the five annexes of the Convention . Th e annexes relating to oil, noxious substances in hulk, harmful substances in packaged form s and garbage have entered into force while the annex relating to sewage is waiting entry int o force . Discussions are underway regarding alien marine organisms . The Guidelines fo r Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Aquatic Organisms and Pathogens from Ship s Ballast Water and Sediment Discharges were adopted by the Marine Environmen t Committee in July 1991 . The object of this paper is to establish the urgency of institutin g 1 measures to prevent an untoward incident from happening in the Malacca Straits . It als o reviews the experience of Australia and attempts to draw lessons from that experience . Indonesian Natural Resources Polic y The guidelines of Indonesian Government Policy determine that the natura l resources of the country, in the form of land, air, minerals, flora and fauna including geneti c resources, whether on shore, in the sea or in the air, should be managed and utilised for th e greatest possible benefit . At the same time, the environment should be preserved to produc e the greatest possible advantage for development and public welfare for both present an d future generations . The policy on the management of natural resources and the environment is deal t with in four basic programs : • The assessment and evaluation of natural resources and the environment . • Measures to safe guard forest, land and water . The management of natural resources and the environment . • The development of skills and knowledge in the field of meteorological an d geophysical science . ' The marine zone is considered one of the important sectors of national development . The archipelagic state concept underlines national development in general, and includes th e realisation of the Indonesian archipelago as one political, social, cultural and economi c entity, as well as one entity for defence and security . Under this concept a basic pattern o f national development was established, consisting of a general pattern that forms the basi c foundation for medium term development covering a period of 25 divided into several Five - Year Development Plan (REPELITA) stages . ' Development of marine affairs has been directed towards the diversification , exploration and exploitation, and productivity of the marine resources and the preservatio n of its ecosystem with the appropriate application of science and technology . Exploratio n and exploitation require expansion of scientific knowledge of the resource potential o f Indonesian maritime areas including the sea-bed and sub soil . The resource potential of th e ocean is huge and to date this has been only partially tapped, especially in the case of oil , gas and some mineral products and to a lesser extent fisheries . The economic potential o f the production of energy from the waters, current and winds is yet to be explored . Indonesia's sea water of some 2.1 million km square represents a source o f enormous fisheries potential, estimated at 6 .7 million tons a year of which an annual 4 . 4 million tons is thought to be available from territorial waters and 2.3 million tons from th e Exclusive Economic Zone (FEZ) . Development of the fisheries sector is an importan t element in the Indonesian government's promotion of re g ional development and economi c growth for the nation as a whole . Measured in current prices, the volume of total fisherie s production has grown rapidly in recent years, exports of shrimp, tuna and other types of fis h have also increased rapidly from USS667 .3 million in 1989 to t'SS1.46 billion in 1995 . ' To preserve the economic resources within Indonesia's sea and coastal areas, effort s were instituted to rehabilitate damaged areas and to prevent further damage to coasta l 2 areas from sea water erosion . Some of the areas under rehabilitation include the 8,50 0 hectares of mangrove forests in East Java, West Java, Central Java, North Sumatra , Lampung, South Sulawesi, Bali, and West Nusa Tenggara provinces . In addition se a gardens were preserved and developed in the Thousand Islands (Jakarta Bay), Pomb o Island (Maluku), Karimunjawa (Central Java), Bunaken (North Sulawesi), Cendrawasih Ba y (Irian Jaya) and Take Bonerate (South Sulawesi) . ` The Malacca Strait s Another major concern being seriously considered is the deteriorating state of th e waters in the Malacca Straits, which have shown significant signs of degradation mainly du e to oil pollution and unauthorised ballast discharges . The Malacca Straits (Figure 1) is the main passage between the Indian Ocean, th e South China Sea, and the Pacific Ocean . Maritime traffic through the strait is heavy wit h over 2(1(1 ships ' per day . or more than 60,0(1(1 ships annually passing through, and this i s anticipated to grow to approximately 100,(10(1 transits annually by the year of 2000 '' It i s also a significant route for warships . The issue of submerged submarine passage does no t arise owing to the relatively shallow depth of water . The length of the combined Malacc a and Singapore Straits is approximately 600 nautical miles . At its narrowest point the Strait is 3 .2 nautical miles wide, and territorial waters ar e found throughout the straits . Three littoral states namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapor e have drawn three boundary lines in their overlapping territorial seas within the Straits . Voluntary pilotage is encouraged in certain sections of the Strait . ' During the Third Law o f the Sea Conference, Malaysia and Indonesia tried very hard to promote the view that th e Strait of Malacca was not an international strait . This was in order to counter the growin g consensus that the international straits should be governed by the more liberal regime o f transit passage rather than innocent passage through territorial seas . Their concerns wer e with pollution and a desire to regulate passage by warships . In keeping with the increasing economies of the littoral states of Southeast and Eas t Asia, the intensity of traffic through the straits has increased . Indonesia, Malaysia an d Singapore have identified the need for appropriate arrangements regarding the prevention o f accidents and the safety of navigation through the Straits . In the early 1980's, through th e common efforts of these three states and with approval of the International Maritim e Organisation (IMO), a "Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) was instituted at the southern en d of the Malacca Straits, the most crucial area of navigation . These congested . shallow, and narrow straits are a concern for maritime safety . Over 1,100 fully laden supertankers "' pass towards the east through the straits every year , many with only a couple of meters of clearance between their keels and the sea bottom . About 26 tankers ' per day are estimated to pass throu g h the Malacca Straits . In terms o f volume, crude oil accounted for about 58 percent of interregional cargo tonnage passin g through the Malacca Straits in 1993 . 2 The physical condition of the Malacca Strait s 3 1 IIfgp o f h7t'ann¢l  art On •  F  Utio n I  Rahhathani y  o Nang A w y . nel E  Na k --  KR1 1 ►D"  ANI 1_  (B  OK) 1 HEP F 4 # DIA oYrMho• n Ylnlr ' T `,'~  t M . 1 1 `is r  '"  t~ t lap  Gulf  0 Thai  5 [hump -  of  Z IsNAlnus o Kra ? ~1  m N ` 1 Co n t " ' t F~1 I MP N So 5 P 9 II,V a Ail i ' t~ f = Iau a ° RNem ^' A -  t nu ! . a %  1 ~  a~, • ulau  i vela Twi n ~'i  :'S' n r '  +r  L1  I a  'r .AS t ' ~ 4_ Y S Ywtaa A PUTAUA N b ! • ANAMBA . S APORE _s~g~e~e n ,  Pula . Ntit u KEP ATtiN A ~ . .~ f ~~_  ! s `  (INDONESIA ) 'y ~'? :  N art b u Si*oifoe L w UNGG 1' ," °" - AdaSrbO ' KE p #ttAUA$ ~ 2- :"Iii ' .p Bangka  - 0 --  ^tAWAN~ , - O . P .ongEolpina,i g Outo a Pvlau  S -'- nJ PuJJI ~ F ~ 9 ~, ~ uU JAVA SEA ' _ SELA - T-SgINOA, ( .STt2q(T ag SELA 7 T -WE 7 q * 'Briggs ~ . .~ AR f A le S EEPS'" ,fi n Cireho n Yogaka Figure 1 . The Strait of Malacc a including the Strait of Singapore, are such that an accident, especially one involving a tanker, would have serious ecological impact on coasts on both sides of the Strait . Th e disposal of waste by passing ships, which is contrary to existing regulations, also has majo r cumulative ecological impac t Ecological Conditions of the Strai t Due to the conver g ence of warm and cold currents some areas of the Malacc a Straits are rich in fisheries, and other sea living species such as: molluscs, sponges, turtle s and sea birds . On the Indonesian side, coastal cities like Tanjung Balai Karimun, Dumai , Tanjung Balai Asahan, and Belawan are important fisheries ports . The commercial an d traditional fishing fleets in these areas are generally engaged in fish and shrimp trawling, a s well as trawling for.scallops, reef linefishing, trolling for squid, inshore netting, and cra b fishing . Tanjung Balai Asahan in particular, over the past two decades has had the riches t fish production for the western part of Indonesia . A number of new fishing ports have bee n constructed in recent years to help boost fisheries activities . These include those at Sibolga , and Belawan in North Sumatra, Pelabuhan Ratu in West Java. and at Ambon in Maluku . The islands of Aruah, approximately 25 nautical miles north-west of One Fathom Ban k Lighthouse, is a breeding place of some turtle species and sea birds . Similarly, on the Malaysian side of the Strait, where coastal cities including Lumut , Penang, Port Swettenhem and Port Dickson are located, there is also considerabl e involvement in the fishing industry. At Penang and Langkawi island, the tourist industry ha s grown rapidly in recent years. The above facts highlight the significance of the Malacca Straits for the people living in the littoral and those who are dependent on the coastal are a for their livelihood . To preserve such a valuable source of livelihood, measures to protec t the Malacca Straits from marine pollution are required . Oceanographic Conditions of the Strai t Density . mobility and the capacity to dissolve a wide range of materials are thre e fundamental properties of sea water which make the scale of the management of marin e environments very complex when compared with that of terrestrial areas. The density of se a water enables it to support sediment, other small particles and plant and animal cells. Large r animals and plants can remain in the water column for a long period or all of their lif e through buoyancy, while using a manageably small amount of energy . Large bodies of wate r are constantly mobile, driven by winds . current derived from the rotation of the earth and b y tides generated by the gravitational effects of the moon and planets . While there are prevailing currents, they vary and even reverse . Water masses mi x and merge and the food nutrients, larvae and pollutants which they carry, may have wide spread effect far from their point of origin . '' In principle, given good physical condition s and environment, sea water has great capacity to dissolve pollutants . To support the clai m that the Malacca Straits is at high risk of damage, the oceanographic conditions of the strai t 5 relative to factors " such as salinity, sea current, photosynthesis and the nature and densit y of pollutants must be considered together to establish how these factors affect the strait' s capacity to absorb the impact of pollution . Salinity . The lower the salinity of sea water, the lower its capacity to dissolv e pollutants, therefore salinity is regarded as the most important characteristic of sea water . The level of salinity decreases in places where rivers empty into the sea . There are man y estuaries on both sides of the Malacca Straits which account for the low level of salinit y found there . Because of its narrow width and extensive length, the water column is not a s great as the volume of fresh water discharging from the rivers . Additionally, the lowe r salinity can also be attributed to the high concentration of industry and human settlemen t areas on the nearby rivers that empty into the Malacca Straits . Sea Current . Another factor affecting the capacity of sea water to dissolv e pollutants is sea current. Horizontal currents are caused mainly by differences in air pressur e and the rise and fall on the tides. Horizontal sea currents lead to the spread of pollution ove r wider areas . This in turn reduces the existing levels of pollution, by mixing it with large r masses of water . Therefore reduction of pollution levels and subsequent dissolution occur s faster in the open seas than in enclosed sea environments . In an enclosed sea such as in th e Malacca Straits, horizontal sea currents are not very strong, and the water column is muc h smaller than in the open sea. In addition to the impact of horizontal currents, diffusio n currents are also substantial . Diffusion currents are brought about by temperature gradient s in the vertical plane, and the higher the temperature gradient, the stronger the diffusio n current . In the Malacca Straits, diffusion currents are not as strong as sea currents becaus e of the shallow nature of the Strait . Photosynthesis . The capacity of sea water to dissolve pollutants is also affected b y the amount of available oxygen and sun light as dissolution of pollutants also takes plac e through the process of photosynthesis . In tropical climates, sun light is generally sufficientl y available, but the amount of sun light penetrating water columns is determined by the clarit y of sea water, which is in turn determined by the amount of oxygen available . In an enclose d sea environment, such as the Malacca Straits, the level of clarity of the sea water i s influenced by sediment coming from the numerous rivers emptying into the Straits . Thi s affects the capacity of the sea water to dissolve pollutants . The sea water in the Malacc a Straits can clear faster should there be strong currents, either horizontal or vertical but th e physical conditions of the strait often make this impossible . Nature and Density of Pollutants . In principle, a distinction may be made betwee n soluble and insoluble pollutants . Hydrocarbon and heavy metal substances are the mos t important insoluble pollutants and metal pollutants disturb the ecological balance more tha n hydrocarbons . Hydrocarbon pollutants are mostly sea-borne either coming from ships o r from resource exploitation offshore and mainly take the form of oil spills . Heavy meta l pollutant content in the water is determined by the intensity of industrial activity in coasta l and hinterland areas. Given the existence of many industries on both sides of the Malacc a Straits, oil pollutants have very damagin g effects . They impede the process o f photosynthesis so that the capacity of sea water to dissol v e pollutants decreases . The y reduce the available content of oxygen which adversely affects the marine biotic . When the y reach the coastal zone they disturb coastal ecosystems as well as coral reef systems . 6 The Need to Ensure Safety and Prevent Pollutio n As economic growth continues in the Asia-Pacific region, the carriage of hazardou s and dangerous cargoes has increased significantly . Consequently, there is now, more tha n ever, a higher risk of damage or pollution as a result of collision, explosion, fire, groundin g or other accident invol v ing the ships carrying these dangerous cargoes . In the same way a s national and regional contingency plans are required to clean up oil spills, national an d regional chemical spill response plans may also become necessary . Any accident invol v ing ships in the Malacca Straits would not only disrup t movement of sea trade, but also threaten lives, property and the environment . Examples o f such accidents occurring in the Malacca and Singapore Straits include : the grounding o f Showa Maru supertanker near Pulau Bukom in Singapore in 1975 which spilt 2,300 tons o f crude oil ; the collision between two supertankers, Asian Energy and Century Dawn, i n 1955 : and the collision of two supertankers, Orapin Global and Evoikos, that resulted in th e biggest ever oil spill in the straits of 25,000 tons in 1997 . " National and Regional Efforts on Pollution Prevention and Contro l In view of the limited capabilities of the littoral states to respond in the event of a serious accident, and since pollution in the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Singapor e would have an impact across nations, international cooperation is necessary . The issue o f trans-boundary pollution was raised in the Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment an d Development of 1992 which then become the concern of ASEAN at the Singapore Summi t of 1992 . Finally, in 1994 ASEAN adopted the Resolution on Environment an d Development which was followed by the ASEAN Cooperation and Trans-boundar y Pollution Plan adopted in Kuala Lumpur in 1995 . In the last meeting of the CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific ) Maritime Cooperation Working Group on 19 November 1997 in Tokyo, the Indonesia n delegation raised the issue of the Malacca Straits, including the Strait of Singapore, bein g designated as a Special Area under coastal management in an enclosed sea environment, an d that all the three littoral states of those straits should be attached in all regional an d international marine environment forums . The process toward that goal would certainly need international cooperatio n considering that the prevention of ship-borne pollution in the Malacca Straits can no longe r be separated from the safety of navigation . Along the strait, Indonesia has established 3 5 navigational aids of various kinds . Each year, the Indonesian government has to repair o r replace around ten percent of these because of collision with passing ships . '' ' This number i s significant as an indicator of the level of proficiency on the part of some seafarers using th e Malacca Straits . It thus raises the question of supervision of compliance with IMO, MS C (Maritime Safety Committee) and STWC (Standards of Training, Certification an d Watchkeeping for Seafarers) regulations . Perhaps this needs to be addressed more closel y by the three littoral states of the Malacca Straits . 7 Oil rig in the South China Se a (Courte'cv of 92 Hine Rocal Aucntrliwi Air Fori r) In keeping with the commitment of the three littoral states to the safety of navigatio n in the Malacca Straits, serious efforts towards pollution prevention and control in the Strait s are being undertaken . This is clearly embodied in Annex D to the agreement of 1997 . A Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) was formed to formulate joint policy to dea l specifically with marine pollution by coordinating resources, man power and technology. I n addition, the TTEG will consider the possibility of creating a revolving fund for marine anti - pollution activities . Those two tasks clearly demonstrate the desire to foster regional an d international cooperation . At the TTEG forum, cooperation in the installation of VTS (Vessel Traffic Services ) for the entire Strait of Malacca in anticipation of an agreement on TSS along the straits, wa s discussed by the IMO. VTS is a vehicle for the exchange of information of great importanc e to overall maritime safety and can be integrated, with the VTS owned by Singapore so tha t it may result in tripartite cooperation. The benefit of VTS along the Malacca Straits will b e felt by all users . On the other hand, in order to detect oil pollution, satellite sensing an d aircraft equipped with SLARs (Side-looking Airborne Radars) are needed . " Data collecte d from air detection may be communicated to a pollution centre by the state operating th e aircraft and distributed to other national centres . States littoral to the Malacca Straits have raised concerns regarding the possibility o f hazardous cargoes having to pass through the Straits where there have been frequen t shipping accidents and incidents of piracy . The issue of restricting the passage of vessel s carrying nuclear or other hazardous cargoes has been raised . Among the suggestions bein g made are the provision of advance notice of the impending passage, and the diversion o f these vessels to avoid the Straits altogether . It has been observed that such measures coul d conceivably be implemented under the auspices of the IMO in the form of regulations . ` " Regional and international joint cooperation is also necessary to protecting th e Straits from the influence of dangerous cargoes by making use of International Sea Powe r Symposium, ASEAN Regional Forum and Western Pacific Naval Symposium activities fo r consideration of key issues . Today, awareness of environment preservation is a globa l consideration as attested by the Second Conference on Habitat . Preservation of th e environment in the Malacca Straits should form part of that global awareness, in view of th e strategic importance of the Straits, in terms of geo-strategic and sub-regional, regional an d international economic interests . The Issue on Bosphorus and Dardanelles Strait s The latest issue being considered by the IMO is the Bosphorus and Dardanelle s Straits (Figure 2) . This is a relatively similar case to the Malacca and Singapore Straits . Turkey's two Straits currently provide the only outlet for Russian oil exports but ar e becoming too busy to handle the main oil production from big Caspian developmen t projects to western markets . The sea traffic record indicates that over 51,000 vessel s transited these Straits in 1997, including about 2,500 oil tankers . '' Turkey's government ha s appointed a council to prepare new legislation for the Straits, to improve local passenge r and cargo ships, international transit traffic, and to lessen ship accidents. The legislation wil l amend several articles of previous legislation on this issue dating from 1994, and will 9 I  . ~ ) 14m3r ~~ d F (Chersori Kkno v C r i m Simferoo 12 5 Sevastopo l N kolaY e D9t cen .KOlarrvK . , S t } Cherno p ! atT Baia Mar e ~ .IarO ~Piel + a as v Orap' Cluj Nap o so o' Je~evo ^ S r °pelearad Niko p ota ;hn i velozerev 1 K noan Varna t Karat . * yv r gos Tekir a 5 5%00116 mesm  eat Marmar a `a  --  :St .  mi t ' t `  ~ ~~ r5 d L 16  kkala } ~ . x25491 . ~ 9  Lem 1 i A E G E A N  1 ~ l KG b y A ir, i GNerteem  ~,  Ayvalik  t  } '_ .,  S Seeder  Leseoa . IS :/ 3  I  Akh ' IA .. l unua SEA,- ( v •She  corns ; i, ''N- `  / rzi " ',Andros ~`-) A d PI  7 I- _  .S6!rms~  V ems .  zl l 12 .4  AI ;eb Dent 'E r Karme V /4 ddho S Rddhos Benin Aname e Bol o ana Finik e Figure 2 . The Bosphorous and Dardanelles Strait s 10 increase the pre-notification period in which a vessel must inform authorities of its intende d transit . The legislation will also make provision for penalties . Turkey was scheduled to inform the IMO of its new legislation at a meetin g scheduled for May 1998 in London. The new legislation stipulates that vessels of 151) t o 21)1) metres in length must notify the authorities 24 hours prior to their passage. The perio d will be 48 hours for those of 21)0 to 300 metres or vessels with nuclear waste or othe r hazardous cargo . In the medium term some of that oil can go through the Straits, but in th e long term all nations, including the United States, see the only feasible solution being th e Baku-Ceyhan oil pipe line, that will cost about USS2 .5 billion, and run from Baku to it s Ceyhan port through Georgia and eastern Turkey . The aim is to carry the Caspian's main oi l output to western markets by avoiding further tanker passage through the Straits . Marine Environmental Management : The Australian Experienc e Australia has always been concerned about its coast, common lands and commo n coastal environment . Since its federation, there have been many inquiries relating to th e management of coastal environments . This is manifested in the several policies pertinent t o the management and protection of the marine environment formulated in recent years .' ° Australia has tended to follow policies that support the concept of multiple use . Multiple use management involves the allocation of resources on geographical scale s and across sufficient time periods so that the integrity of ecosystems can be maintained an d the evolutionary potential of biological diversity can be accommodated . It include s consideration, before resource allocation decisions are made, of possibilities for uses whic h can occur in much the same area at the same time, and those which require separation i n space or in time, with the objective of retention of the greatest number of possible option s for the future . Management must also be adaptive, able to respond to indications of advers e change in the environment, changes in social, cultural, and economic values, and changes i n understanding and technology . Before decisions are made about allocation of ocean resources, a number of factor s need to he taken into account : Objective assessment of the resources and values of an area, and potential impact s from proposed uses . The value and impacts of alternative uses . ▪ The level of compatibility amongst potential uses of the resources of an area, and th e potential for maximising the benefits, or the value to the community by encouragin g multiple and sequential use of the resource . • The positive identification of means of detecting undesirable environmenta l outcomes, and actions to be taken to mitigate adverse impacts .- ' Management for multiple uses should ensure that decisions about access to and/o r use of resources are objective and transparent and include explicit assessment of impacts, i n particular on other recognised uses and ecosystem integrity . Integrated management o f multiple uses should provide a capacity to manage conflicts between uses which maximis e the flow of benefits to the community in term of environment, social. cultural and economi c 11 outcomes . Annex A discusses the characteristics of ecosystem based oceans planning an d management . Marine Protected Are a The generalised definition of protected area is intended to apply equally to marin e and terrestrial areas . As adopted in the context of the Australian National Reserves System , a Marine Protected Area (MPA) is an area of land or sea specifically dedicated to th e protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and natural and associated resources , managed through legal or other effective means . Australia's success in convincing th e international community of the need to institute serious measures to preserve the marin e habitat is evident from the numerous sites in Australia declared as MPAs . In fact, as o f 1992, there are 303 MPAs in Australia totalling an area of 463,200 square kilometres . Thi s represents about 5 .2 percent of Australia's marine environment . ' owever a very larg e proportion of this (74 percent) is within a single MPA, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park . By IMO definition, a MPA is any area of inter-tidal or sub-tidal terrain, togethe r with overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical, and cultural features, which ha s been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclose d environment . MPAs are a very important tool for marine conservation and management , particularly in protecting biodiversity and achieving sustainable use of marine resources . Establishing a national network of MPAs around Australia is the primary objective of th e `Ocean Rescue 2000 Program' . MPAs may serve many functions including conserving nature, protecting huma n heritage and providing tourism, recreation, education and research opportunities . Australi a is a world leader in using MPAs for marine conservation and management and has 2 4 percent of the total number of MPAs in the world . Most MPAs in the southern and easter n half of continent are small, yet this is where human activity is greatest and the demand fo r conservation action is highest . The largest MPAs tend to be away from the areas of highes t human activity . However MPAs are established to maintain biodiversity and should b e sufficiently large to maintain ecosystem functions, to protect all life cycle stages and t o achieve adequate buffering or dilution of impact from human activity . MPAs might also b e placed adjacent to land protected areas, and mana g ed in a complementary manner . Th e major multiple use MPAs around Australia are described in Annex B . " The Great Barrier Reef Marine Par k The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) is the world's largest reef complex , the largest multiple-use MPA and a World Heritage Site . It is approximately 2,300 km lon g and comprises 2,800 separate reefs, including 760 fringing reefs and 940 islands . The Grea t Barrier Reef (GBR) is not a continuous barrier but a broken maze of coral reefs . These reef s range in size from less than one hectare to more than 100 square kilometres and in shap e from flat platform reefs to elongated ribbon reefs . It was established under the GBRMP Ac t 1975 and is managed by the Commonwealth GBRMP Authority, with the Queenslan d Department of Environment and Heritage responsible for day to day management . Majo r uses include tourism (there are approximately 2 million visitors to the GBR and its coas t 12 each year), commercial and recreational fisheries, and shipping . Economic value of th e GBRMP is over AUDI billion per Annum . " Major environmental issues include: wate r quality, especially elevated nutrients in shore areas ; outbreaks of crown-of thorns starfish ; large-scale perturbations such as cyclones and coral bleaching events ; effects of trawling o n sea floor biota ; effects of fishing on reefs ; threat of oil spills from shipping ; and effects o f tourism and recreation . ' Lessons from The Great Barrier Ree f The GBRMP Authority has established conservation and management regimes fo r the GBR region . The GBRMP Act was the first Act in Australia based on concepts whic h are now known as ecologically sustainable development . The Act requires the Authority t o provide for conservation and reasonable use of the GBR . The provisions of the Act make it clear that it is expected that some parts of the ree f will he preserved but that the majority will be available for use which is not incompatibl e with maintenance of the GBR as a natural productive ecosystem . The GBRMP has bee n seen as a national and international model for some aspects of marine and coastal zon e management . Conceptually the management system is that of an overarching authorit y which is responsible for formulating policies and to oversee management arrangements t o ensure that they are consistent with conservation . The reef represents the world ' s largest system of corals and associated life forms . I t is the greatest known marine repository of biodiversity, and a unique area requiring th e highest level of environmental protection . In some places the reefs are separated by channel s no more than 200 metres wide, while elsewhere the reefs may be as much as 20 kilometre s apart . Most reefs are submerged, with some being exposed at low tide . For shipping, th e GBR can be a formidable obstacle to navigation . In most places, the reef is many kilometre s from the coast, but the waters within the outer barrier are also studded with submerge d shoals and reefs . Added to these hazards are strong trade winds and occasional cyclone s which are characteristic of the region . The inner route through the Reef (Figure 3) is a significant sea route, wit h approximately 2000 transits 26 per year by large vessels or vessels carrying hazardou s cargoes. This represents only 3 .3%c of the annual transits of the Malacca Straits . The rout e offers relatively calm water, but it is intricate and shallow . Within the route there are als o areas of intense fishing activity which reach a peak in the trawling season between April an d October . Between October and April the area is subject to heavy rain which reduce s visibility and the effectiveness of some navigation aids . Having surveyed various options fo r reducing the risk of maritime accidents in the reef region, Australia is proceeding t o implement a scheme of compulsory pilotage for ships which constitute a potential threat t o the GBR . The implementation of this scheme has been preceded by an internationa l campaign consisting of three phases . During the first phase, international representations were made to seek complianc e with the existing system of voluntary pilotage for the region . This system covers all ships o f 100 metres in length and over, and all loaded oil tankers, chemical carriers or liquefied ga s carriers irrespective of size . navigating the Torres Strait, the inner route of the GBR, th e 13 Great North-East channel and Hydrographer Passage . In 1987 Australia sought and gaine d endorsement from the IMO for this scheme in the GBR and Torres Strait region . It i s embodied in IMO resolution A . 619 (15) of 19 November 1987 which was adopted b y consensus . In seeking to promote compliance with the IMO resolution, Australia monitore d ships defined by the resolution transiting the inner route of the GBR without a pilot . In each case the flag state was contacted and its assistance sought in urgin g compliance by the shipping company involved . Many vessels have, however, ignored thi s resolution and have continued to transit the defined area without a pilot . This amounts t o approximately 200 unpiloted transits per year . In February 1990 Australia intensivel y lobbied the governments of those countries whose ships were not availing themselves of th e voluntary system . Despite these efforts there was not a noticeable increase in complianc e and as a consequence . the risk of accident remained unacceptably high . In the second phase, Australia participated in the development, within the IMO, o f the new concept of Particularly Sensitive Areas . A seminar on Sensitive Sea Areas was hel d under the auspices of the IMO in September 1990 in Sweden, attended by experts fro m approximately fifty countries . The seminar endorsed the guidelines for Particularly Sensitiv e Areas . It also called on the IMO to identify the GBR as Particularly Sensitive Area and t o recognise compulsory pilotage as an appropriate measure in such an area under certai n circumstances . At the same time Australia embarked on the major diplomatic effort to gai n support from the IMO for identification of the GBR as a Particularly Sensitive Area an d endorsement of Australia's pilotage scheme in the Reef region . The third phase involved a global lobbying campaign to achieve formal identificatio n of the GBR as a Particularly Sensitive Area and international endorsement of a compulsor y pilotage scheme through the IMO . These goals were achieved in November 1990 at th e thirtieth session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in London . Thus resolution MEPC .44 (30) of 16 November 1990 identified the GBR as the world' s first Particularly Sensitive Area . Resolution MEPC .45 (31)) adopted on the same day , recommended compulsory pilotage for merchant ships of 70 metres in length and over an d oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers . irrespective of size, navigating the inner rout e of the GBR between the northern extreme of Cape York Peninsula (10 degrees 41 minute s South) and 16 degrees 40 minutes South and in Ilydrographer Passage . The culmination of this effort has been the introduction of amendments to th e GBRMP Act 1975 implementing the compulsory pilotage scheme . The new scheme cam e into effect in the latter part of 19 9 1 . The rate of compliance with the scheme should b e virtually MO percent . significantly reducing the risk of collisions or grounding of vessel s representing a potential hazard to the region . The compulsory pilotage scheme and th e identification of the GBR as a Particularly Sensitive Area represents a major step in securin g greater environmental protection for this unique and irreplaceable ecosystem .2 " Designation of the Malacca Straits as a 'Special Area ' MARPOL 73/78 provides that in cases where a special area is within the jurisdictio n of more than one State, agreement should be reached between the States involved before a proposal is submitted to MEPC . With regard to the Malacca Straits it is important for th e 14 Figure 3 . The inner route through the Great Barrier Reef 15 three littoral states to have a common perception and then intensively lobby th e governments of other countries, particularly the users of Straits if they are to gain suppor t for designation of the Malacca Straits as a Special Area under Annexes 1, 11 and V o f MARPOL 73/78 . Using the lessons learnt from the experienceof others such as Australia, this can b e done through coordination and cooperationofthe coastal states, the IMO and Regional an d Multilateral joint cooperative programs . Users ofthe Straitsof Malacca and Singapore wil l have to implement all provisions therein. As pollution from hydrocarbon and heavy meta l substances have the worst impact, regulation to control these two kinds of pollution shoul d be strengthened, particularly in respect to pollution from lead substances . To foster better joint coordination and cooperation, the coastal states requir e resources such as hardware, software and manpower for pollution prevention programs . The early detection of pollution from passing ships would require a satellite remote sensin g capability in addition to aircraft fitted with the SLAR . Full implementation ofall provision s of MARPOL 73/78 would need regional coordination in the fields of education, training , research and development, joint operations and joint funding . The most important facto r will be the exchange of operational information relating to pollution and the safety o f navigation . Based on the provisions for Special Areas in MARPOL 73/78, the government o f each Party to the convention having a coastline which borders on any given special area , undertakes to ensure that all oil loading terminals and repair ports within the special are a have facilities adequate for reception and treatment of all dirty ballast, residues and mixture s containing noxious liquid substances, and garbage . The special area regulation should b e applied for each area on the basis of notification by the states bordering the special are a where reception facilities are available . 28 In this regard, the littoral states should be provide d with facilities adequate for reception and treatment of all marine pollution from ships . The three littoral states should undertake a lobbying campaign in regional and internationa l forums in order to try and achieve this goal . MARPOL 73/78 in annexes I, 11, and V define certain sea areas as 'Special Areas ' in relation to the type ofpollution covered by each annex . A 'Special Area' is a defined as a sea area where, for recognised technical reasons in relation to its oceanographic an d ecological condition and to the particular character of its traffic, the adoption of specia l mandatory methods for prevention of sea pollution by oil, noxious liquid substances o r garbage, as applicable, is required . ' nder the Convention, the special areas are provide d with higher levels of protection than other areas of the sea . Additional protection is given t o special areas with respect to operational discharges of oil (Annex I) . noxious liqui d substances (Annex 1l), and garbage (Annex V) . Most of the existing special areas were declared at the time when MARPOL 197 3 was conceived and adopted . The Gulf of Aden (Annex l) . the North Sea (Annex V), th e Antarctic (Annexes 1 & V), and the Wider Caribbean (Annex V) special areas wer e designated after 1973 as amendments to MARPOL 73/78 . Table 1 lists the sea areas tha t have been designated as special areas under MARPOL . } " 16 Annex I Annex II Annex V The Mediterranean Sea area The Baltic Sea area The Mediterranean Sea are a The Baltic Sea area The Black Sea areaThe Baltic Sea are a The Black Sea area The Black Sea are a The Red Sea area The Red Sea are a The Gulfs area The Gulfs are a The Gulf of Aden The North Sea are a The Antarctic area The Antarctic are a The Wider Caribbean area Table 1 . Special areas designated under MARPOL 73/7 8 Procedures for the Designation of a Special Are a A proposal to designate the Malacca Straits as a special area should be submitted t o the IMO for consideration by its MEPC. The submission date for the proposal should be a t least three months before a session of the MEPC . The proposal should contain a draf t amendment to MARPOL 73/78 providing the formal basis for the designation of an area a s a special area, together with a background document addressing : • The definition of the area which is proposed as a special area, including an indicatio n of its precise geographical location . It is essential also to include a reference chart . • An indication of the type of special area proposed . Proposals can be made wit h respect to Annexes I, IT, and V of MARPOL 73/78, but proposals for designation o f a given area as a special area should be evaluated and submitted separately for eac h annex . • A general description of the area including such issues as its oceanography , ecological characteristics, social economic value, scientific and cultural significance , environmental pressures and measures already taken to protect the environment o f the proposed area . The general description may be supported by annexes containin g additional information on the area, or references to documentation . • A review of the criteria for the designation of a special area showing that the area i n question satisfies those criteria . The criteria which must be satisfied in order for a n area to be given special area status are oceanographic conditions, ecologica l conditions and vessel traffic characteristics . " Given the oceanographic and ecological conditions of the Malacca Straits couple d with an already high and continuously increasing density of traffic the probability of ship - borne pollution will continue to increase unless strict control and management is exercise d in the Straits in accordance with the International Convention for the Prevention o f Pollution from ships (MARPOL 73/78) . To preserve the marine environment and th e valuable source of livelihood for the people who are living on the coast, the Malacca Strait s should be designated by the IMO as a 'Special Area' under Annexes I, II and V o f MARPOL 73/78 . 1 7 VI BP Achiexe r 18 Conclusio n The ASEAN plan, particularly in relation to ship borne pollution, indicates a potential for sub-regional action to implement MARPOL 73/78 . With the task assigned t o the TTEG, a joint policy should be formulated to deal with marine pollution at the sub - regional level based on the strategic location, economic and environmental aspects with a priority on the safety of the coastal states and passing vessels . The littoral states shoul d control and manage marine pollution and these should be designated by development of a n IMO Convention providing for the Malacca Straits to be designated as a `Special Area ' under Annexes I, 11 and V of MARPOL 73/78 for the protection of marine environmen t from ship pollution and the dumping of waste . In view of the complexity of the problems relating to the two straits, one channel o f cooperation would not suffice . Rather, beginning with bilateral arrangements betwee n littoral states, there should be various forms of cooperation that are mutuall y complementary and interlocking with scope for expansion . A comprehensive vision i s necessary, not only on the part of government officials and the private sector but the whol e of society to ensure that a national approach will provide government sectors and agencie s with common objectives for marine management thus minimising duplication and conflict . I t would also ensure more effective use of human and financial resources, by poolin g experience, resources and knowledge . It would also provide a framework for nationa l leadership, financial support and community and industry involvement throughout th e coastal zone . Australia has achieved the formal identification of the Great Barrier Reef as a Particularly Sensitive Area and has achieved international endorsement of the compulsor y pilotage scheme through the IMO after a long struggle . It took Australia more than 1 5 years, from the introduction of amendment to the GBRMP Act 1975, through th e proceedings of the IMO to implement a scheme of compulsory pilotage, which involved a regional and international lobbying campaign . The culmination of this effort was put int o effect in the latter part of 1991 . The rate of compliance with the scheme should be virtuall y IOU percent thereby significantly reducing the risk of collision or grounding of vessel s representing a potential hazard to the region. The three littoral states of the Malacca Strait s should learn from the Australian experience which succeeded in identifying the GBR as th e world's first Particularly Sensitive Area . Notes : I . T H . Huxley in the Report of the Royal commission on the Decline of Fishing in th e North Sea Herring Fleet. Jim Muldon Senior Consultant GBRMPA, Protection an d sustainable use of marine and coastal environments - role of the Royal Australian Navy, p . 2 .  Indonesian Handbook 1994, p . 228 . 19 3.  Dr Etty R Agoes, 'Policing Offshore Zones : Indonesia ' s Model and Experiences ' Policing Australia's Offshore Zones : Problem and Prospects, p . 176 . 4.  Central Bureau of Statistic 1996, pp . 273/274 . 5.  Indonesian Handbook 1997, p . 241 . 6.  Ibid . 7.  Capt Johanes Sarsito, Coastal management in an enclosed sea environment, p . 1 , CSCAP 4th meeting Maritime Cooperation Working Group Tokyo 19 Nov 97 . 8.  RADM Sumihiko Kawamura, (JMSDF,Ret), Shipping and Seaborne Trade Regiona l Security Interests, p . 7 9.  Ivan Shearer, Navigation issues in the Asian Pacific Region Maritime Studies Issue s MSP 1/98 Program, pp . 215/216 . 10.  Supra 8, p . 9 . 11.  Chia Lin Sien, The Strait of Malacca as a Tanker Pipe line Malaysia Institute of Maritime Affairs, Kuala Lumpur 14 -15 June, 1994, p . 9 . 12.  Ibid . 13.  Richard Kenchington, Environmental Management Managing and protecting th e offshore estate Edited by Jack McCaffrie, p . 59-60 . 14.  Supra 7 , p . 3-7 . 15.  LT Col Tan Gim Chang , The Human factor in shipping casualties Scope fo r Regional cooperation in the training and education of seafarers, p . 1 . 16.  Supra 7, p . 8 . 17.  Supra 7, p . 12-13 . 18.  Alan Khee - Jin Tan, Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straitsof Malacc a and Singapore Vol .2 Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 1997, p . 92 A . 19.  Hidir Goktas, Turk Straits cannot handle Caspian oil Reuters News Service 26 Ma r 1998 . 20.  The Draft of Australia's ocean policy , May 1998, pp . 27-36 . 21.  Ibid . 20 22. Leon P . Zarin, Our Sea Our Future, pp . 82 . 23. Ibid ., pp . K6-K8 . 24. J F . Whitehouse, A Review of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, pp . 33 . 25. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority Annual Report 97/97, pp . 13-2K . 26. Gregory French, Protecting the Great Barrier Reef, p. 9, Sea Law and Ocean Polic y Group Department Foreign Affair and Trad e 27. Ibid ., pp . 1(1-13 . 2K .  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MARPO L 73/7K , p. 22 . 29. Ibid ., pp . 90-93 . 30. IMO Resolution A .72(1(17), pp . 354/355 and 359 . 31. Ibid . p. 342 . 21 ANNEX A CHARACTERISTICS OF ECOSYSTEM-BASED OCEANS PLANNING AN D MANAGEMEN T Ecological connections are recognised . Connections between and across all ecological dimensions (species, populations, habitat an d regions) are taken into account in resolving problems, a focus on one level is inadequate . ▪ Planning and management boundaries recognise ecosystems . Management recognises the extent and distribution of ecological entities, requirin g integration across other administrative, sectoral and jurisdictional boundaries . Ecosystem integrity is maintained . The maintenance of ecological integrity is a fundamental management objective . Thi s involves ensuring the maintenance of Australia ' s total marine biological diversity (genes , species, communities and habitats) and the ecological processes that underpin that diversity . Data is collected for ecosystem-based management . The understanding of ecosystem implications of decisions will often require informatio n beyond that needed to manage individual resource sectors. Inventory of biological diversit y assets . baseline assessments of ecosystem functions and the interactions between sector s will contribute to understanding of ecological processes and impacts of particular activities . ▪ Mana g ement is monitored for ecosystem maintenance . Measurable ecosystem-based performance indicators are used to asses the success or failur e of management . Monitoring provides feedback that is critical to evaluating and refinin g management approaches, supporting adaptive and precautionary management . Management decisions are planned and precautionary . Management decisions are planned. based on anticipation of the consequences of use, rathe r than being solely reactive . When consequences are uncertain or potentially irreversible o n the time scale of human generation the precautionary principle should be applied . Human activity is recognised as a fundamental influence . Management should generally aim to influence the human activity or use . rather than th e marine resources directly . Human activities have a fundamental influence on many marin e ecological patterns and processes and are in turn affected by them . • Natural and human values should be integrated . Biological diversity values are recognised and incorporated in all resource-allocatio n processes that could affect ocean ecosystems, even where scientific and technica l knowledge may be insufficient for a full definition of values . It is recognised that huma n values will play is dominant role in decisions about ocean uses . ' Note : The draft of Australia ' s Oceans Policy 1995 . p 29 ANNEX B OTHER MAJOR MULTIPLE USE MARINE PROTECTED AREAS (MPA ) AROUND AUSTRALI A Torres Strait Protected Are a The Torres Strait is a 150 km wide, shallow passage between Cape York and Papu a New Guinea (PNG) . It contains many reefs, over 100 islands and cays, and a population o f 6,31)0 Torres Strait Islanders . It has major populations of dugong and turtles . The Torre s Strait Treaty with Papua New Guinea protects the marine environment, provides access fo r vessels and allocates fisheries and mineral resources . Major uses include shipping and praw n and rock lobster fishing . Major environmental issues include possible contamination b y heavy metals from PNG mines, treatment of oil spills from shipping, PNG off-shore oi l activities, and the effects of prawn trawling . The Ningaluo Marine Par k The Ningaloo Marine Park is Australia ' s the third longest MPA enclosin g Australia's longest fringing reef and was established in 1987 . It extends 260 km along th e coast of Western Australia (WA) and has an area of 4,572 square km . Ningaloo is a n ecologically unique mainland fringing coral reef and contains significant populations o f dugongs, humpback whales, shore birds, turtles and whale sharks . Ningaloo Marine Park i s managed by the WA Department of Conservation and Land Management . Major use s include tourism and recreational fishing . Major environmental issues include outbreaks o f coral-eating Drupella snail, increasing tourism, risk of pollution from oil production outsid e the marine park and shipping . Shark Bay Marine Park and Hamelin Pool Marine Nature Reserv e Shark Bay Marine Park, covering an area of approximately 7,487 square km, an d the adjacent Hamelin Pool Marine Nature Reserve, approximately 1,320 square km in area , were gazetted in 1990 . The sea grass meadows and the calcareous sand bank of Shark Ba y are amongst the worlds most extensive . Shark Bay Marine Park contains the most southerl y resident populations of dugongs and green turtles, the internationally famous bottle nos e dolphins of Monkey Mia, and important nursery areas for several valuable recreational an d commercial fisheries . The Hamelin Pool Marine Nature Reserve includes uniqu e stromatolites and Holocene coquina deposits together with equally significant terrestria l features . The area is included in the World Heritage List . Major uses include commercia l and recreational fishing and tourism . Major environment issues include tourism and the management of fisheries including aqua culture . The major long term issue is the protectio n of the unique stromatolites and sea grass . 23 Solitary Islands Marine Reserv e The Solitary Islands Marine Reserve is a unique area of tropical or temperat e overlapping coral communities, mangroves, rock platforms and rocky reefs . The reserv e extends along 70 km of coast north of Coifs Harbour and has an area of 950 square km . I t is includes State and Commonwealth waters and is managed by New South Wale s Department of Fisheries and the Australian Nature Conservation Agency (ANCA) . Majo r uses include tourism (diving and water sport) and commercial and recreational fishing . Major environment issues include alteration of catchment and eutrophication of estuaries , recreational fisheries and tourism development . Jervis Bay National Par k Jervis Bay is a relatively pristine bay with diverse estuaries, dune, sea grass beds , sand flats, rock platforms and reefs . The land area in the park is 6,312 hectares and th e marine area is 840 hectares . It is part of Commonwealth Jervis Bay Territory and it i s managed by the ANCA . The New South Wales Department of Fisheries is currentl y preparing a management plan for the remaining 93 percent of the bay . Major uses includ e commercial and recreational fishing, recreation and tourism, naval activities, scientifi c research and educational activities . Major environmental issues include aboriginal fishin g rights, the effects of shipping, nutrients from discharges and run-off, tourism an d recreational use . Coringa-Herald and Lihou National Reserve s The Coringa-Herald and Lihou National Reserves are rich and diverse containin g coral sea reefs, cays and important sea bird nestin g sites . These national nature reserve s cover an area of approximately 23,856 square km and are part of the Commonwealth Cora l Sea Islands External Territory which is managed by the ANCA. Major environmental issue s include foreign fishing (fish and clams) and sea borne pollution . Ashmore Reef National Nature Reserv e The Ashmore Reef National Nature Reserve in the Timor Sea is rich and divers e with a large number of coral reefs and sand cays. significant populations of sea snakes an d important sea bird breeding and migratory shore bird roosting sites . This reserve area i s approximately 583 square km and is part of the Commonwealth External Territory o f Ashmore and Cartier Islands which is managed by the ANCA . Major environmental issue s include removal of sea birds and turtles, over fishing . and risk of oil spills 24 Russian merchant vessel in the Malacca Strai t (Courtesy of 92 Wing Royal Australian Air Force) 25 Philippine corvette BRP Artemio Ricart e Courtesy of Mr J . 1 .1ortinie r 26 DEVELOPMENT OF A PHILIPPINE MARITIME SURVEILLANC E CAPABILIT Y Edgar L . Abogado and Reynaldo L . Yom a Introductio n This paper assesses the current maritime surveillance arrangements and procedure s in the Philippines and identifies their strengths and weaknesses . Based on the resultan t evaluation, it identifies possible measures to enhance maritime surveillance arrangements i n the Philippines . To better appreciate the importance of this undertaking, the paper discusse s emerging maritime concerns and relates these issues to the evolving geo-strategic, securit y and economic developments over the maritime areas in the Asia-Pacific region . During the study, various surveillance models currently in place in other countrie s were examined with emphasis on the organisational, management and command structure , coordinating arrangements and other related operational aspects . The paper therefore . presents a generic surveillance structure that may be adopted to a local scenario . Additionally, it identifies the type of command arrangements, management, equipment . facilities and infrastructure necessary to establish the system, and how these should b e employed as part of the overall surveillance regime . Philippines' Maritime Issues And Concern s Overvie w The Philippines is an archipelagic nation composed of more than 7,100 island s situated between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean and is inhabited by over 7 0 ntiilion people which form part of a deep-rooted geographical, social, political an d economic being . The Philippines has an aggregate land mass of 297,000 square kilometer s and a total coastline length of about 17,460 kilometers which is longer than that of mainlan d LISA . Approximately, 60 percent of the population resides in about 10,000 coastal town s and cities . Prominent features of Philippine marine waters include: its natural beauty,a distinct variety of fish, exquisite coral reefs, a potentially oil-rich seabed, and possibl y substantial deposits of minerals, including manganese, nickel and copper . ' The vast expans e of Philip p ine waters . which cover an area roughly six times its aggregate land area, serve a s an essential mode of transportation, a primary source of livelihood for coastal communitie s and a major breeding area and habitat for local wildlife . ' The Philippines are strategically located at the crossroads of the Asia Pacific Regio n and share the major sea corridor for international maritime traffic in the South China Se a which provides the most direct link between the Indian Ocean and East Asia through th e Strait of Malacca and the Indonesian Straits (Figure 1). Currently 40 percent of the world ' s maritime trade, which includes energy and raw materials essential to the booming 27 2 R economies of Southeast and North Asia, passes through the South China Sea . On th e Eastern front is the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean with great reserves of fish which ar e eagerly sought by the large and economically powerful Distant Water Fishing Nations o f East Asia, in particularly Korea, Japan, and Taiwan . Modern technology has made it possible to exploit the bounties of the sea that onl y decades ago were beyond reach . With land based resources depleting and becomin g increasingly insufficient to provide the needs of growing populations in many countries , people now turn to the sea as a primary source of food, medicines, hydrocarbon fuels, har d minerals, animal feeds and construction materials . As a result of the Law of the Se a Convention (LOSC) which established a comprehensive framework on the limits of nationa l jurisdiction and use of all ocean spaces and its resources for economic sustenance, mos t countries in the region have responded by establishing or strengthening their respectiv e ocean management regimes . Underlying these regimes are the inherent functions to manage , protect and preserve the rich marine resources in the coastal and offshore zones for th e benefit of present and future generations . One of the specific tasks of Exclusive Economi c Zone (EEZ) administration is surveillance, which is resource intensive in terms of people , equipment, time and money . Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia, along with many othe r countries in the region, have increased and enhanced their own surveillance capabilities i n response to an increasing awareness of their maritime status and of their nationa l responsibility to detect, monitor and control activities within their territorial and offshor e zones in order to be able to effectively exercise their sovereign rights and jurisdiction ove r these vital maritime areas . The Philippines on the other hand, although considered a maritime nation in th e strict meaning of the term, has yet to evolve from being a primarily agrarian and land-base d economy to that of a major maritime trading nation . While there have been calls for a shif t in development policy that would emphasise the country's status as an archipelagic state, a s stipulated in the recently published National Maritime and Oceans Policy, parallel efforts t o establish a more cohesive and integrated approach towards the management, protection an d sustainable use of resources within sovereign waters are far from adequate . While it is als o true that there have been a number of resource and environmental conservation measures i n the maritime sector including rehabilitation of mangrove areas, establishment an d maintenance of fish sanctuaries and artificial reef planting, these efforts fall short of what i s considered necessary to arrest the rapid rate of marine environmental degradation an d depletion of aquatic resources . Compared to the current efforts devoted to management an d protection of land-based resources, programs directed towards the maritime sector ar e perceived to be less than significant relative to the magnitude of the problem confronting th e maritime environment . The apparent conservative attitude of the government and its citizens toward th e management and development of a maritime regime can be attributed to a number o f factors . One factor is the government's past pre-occupation with land-based program s aimed at restoring internal security and political stability . Efforts toward this end hav e dissipated much of the already scant resources to the detriment and neglect of other equall y important developmental and environmental concerns, including those related to th e maritime environment . The prevailing attitude is exacerbated by the fact that extracting th e resources (except for fish in inshore areas) from the sea is a lot more complex, and in mos t 29 cases, more expensive than those sourced from the land . Such ventures are made even mor e difficult because of the lack of requisite technological knowledge and equipment which ar e only available to developed and wealthy nations . With the advent of a new geopolitical milieu and the course of economi c developments of other countries in the region, the emerging defence and security concern s are not only confined to the traditional military threats but now include economic an d environmental issues as well . Security means much more than just the protection o f sovereign territory from armed attack, but now also implies the ability to preclude externa l intimidation of national institutions and the community at large, freedom ofmovement fo r people and commerce and the extension of national values into the broader community . ' Non-military challenges to maritime security in the region are posed by illegal activities a t sea (eg . piracy, drug smuggling, unlicensed fishing and illegal immigration) and degradatio n of the marine environment through pollution, destruction of habitats and over fishing , among others . Maritime Security and Economic Concern s The Philippines' security environment is essentially maritime and its geograph y provides a substantial natural defence through the lack of shared land boundaries with an y country and the large number of islands suitable for basing strategic defence forces . I n addition, the waters throughout the archipelago can serve as a venue for cooperation wit h neighbouring countries, thereby facilitating mutual benefits in terms of economic an d cultural development . Ironically, while these large bodies of water separating the island s offer numerous benefits, they also present potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited b y an adversary . One major security concern is the continuing problem of maritime jurisdiction , especially in the marginal seas, due to the lack of agreed maritime boundaries, conflictin g claims to offshore islands and overlapping EEZs . As an example. the Philippines ha s maritime claims overlapping the EEZ of neighbouring states such as Indonesia, Malaysia , Vietnam, China and Taiwan . Related to this . on 15 May 1996 China ratified the Unite d Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) becoming the 87th country to adop t the almost international maritime convention which took effect in 1994 . Almos t simultaneously however, on 16 May 1996 China released the coordinates of 78 base point s which form the baselines of part of its territorial sea . The detailed baselines included th e Paracel Islands . and in effect, expanded their territorial sea by about 2 .6 million squar e kilometers from 370,000 square kilometers . The growing industrialisation alongside the rapid growth in population in most part s of Northeast and Southeast Asia has markedly increased the demand for raw materials , fossil fuels and foodstuffs. The energy demand . particularly oil . is projected to rise and wil l progressively broaden to include a wide range of even more rapidly growing nearb y economies. Recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forecasts (Table I ) sugges t that within 15 years . there will be four or five mayor competitors for existing Asian oi l supplies in regional markets traditionally dominated by Japan . ' With the world supply of these goods gradually becomin g scarce, the emergin g economic powers in the region have become more nationalistic and aggressive in th e exploration and exploitation of their domestic resources . They are also becoming mor e 30 assertive in claiming offshore territories with resource potential thereby provoking regiona l conflict and tension . The bloody conflict between Chinese and Vietnamese forces in th e Chigua Reef area of the Spratlys in the South China Sea in March 1988 6 and the recen t Chinese maritime activities in Mischief Reef ' and Scarborough Shoal are examples of th e strategic interplay in the region that may give way to further confrontation . " Share of Total  Asian  O7  Import  (% ) IMPORTING NATION 19922000  201 0 Japan 77.4 53 .2  36 . 5 China -- 10 .9  19 . 4 Taiwan/Hong Kong 10 .09 .7  9 . 0 Korea 21 .0 20 .3  16 . 9 ASEAN 5 .9  16 .9 Table 1 . Emerging Asian Oil Import Rivalr y Source : APEC International Advisory Committee for Energy Intermediate Report . June 1. 1995 . 'notwithstanding the unresolved issue of jurisdiction over the islands in the Sout h China Sea, the region has been experiencing an era of relative p eace and political stability . This development contributed immensely to the unprecedented growth of Philippine gros s domestic product (6 .9% in 1996 and 5 .7% in 1997 9 ) despite Asia's currency turbulence . Approximately 76 percent of annual inter-island export trade and 95 percent of the volum e of imp orted goods are transported through sea .10 Ensuring the safety of commercial vessel s transiting national sea corridors is therefore of profound importance if the present economi c gains are to be sustained in the longer term . With the promulgation of the 200-mile EEZ and continental shelf in accordance wit h the provisions of the LOSC, the Philippines shall have sovereign economic rights over a n EEZ area of 2 .3 million square kilometers " and the resources therein . However, the desir e to reap the immense economic benefits of the EEZ will bring with it an obligation t o improve its capability and management to control and safeguard these resource-rich areas . Therefore, security concerns, now more than ever, involve the sustainable use, developmen t and protection of the living and non-living marine resources for the maximum benefit of it s citizens . '' This aspiration is aptly enshrined in Article 12 of the Philippine Constitutio n which among other things states that "The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth i n its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and EEZ, and reserves its use and enjoymen t exclusively for Filipino citizens" . Philippine coastal waters have some of the world's richest ecosystems, characterise d by extensive coral reefs and dense mangrove forests. Blessed with a warm tropical climat e and high rainfall, these waters are further enriched with nutrients from the land which enabl e them to support a wide diversity of marine life . " The fishery industry contributes about 4 . 5 per cent to gross national product and provides employment to about 5 per cent the tota l labor force . Total fish production for 1993 was 2 .647 million metric tons valued then a t P70 .269B of which a total of P14 .0B (A$517 .67M) was exported to 82 countries . ' " 3 1 1J ; Philippine coastal patrol craft BRP Jose Loor S r COlIlleSy j / . it J . ,Vfl'tilPler ) 32 The Philippines however, is now facing a decline in its fisheries production an d wanton destruction of its resource base in offshore and coastal areas . This phenomenon i s mainly attributed to land and marine-based pollution, over fishing, rampant use o f destructive fishing methods (eg . dynamite, cyanide, 'muro-ami ' , etc.), mining operations , habitat destruction and conversion of mangrove forest to aquaculture ponds in the municipa l sector . " Total economic loss from illegal activities at sea has been estimated at P40 B annually, including 600,000 metric ton of fish worth P15B " ', with the remainder made up o f coral destruction, income foregone for local fishermen, illegal trade and unrealised touris m potential . It is estimated that of the original 27,000 square kilometers of coral reef area , about 70 percent has been seriously damaged " (Table 2) . Similarly, the original 450,00 0 hectares of mangrove forests has been reduced to less than 140 .000 hectares . " SITES EXCELLENTGOOD FAIR POO R Luzon 336 I2(3 .6 gig ) 86(25 .6`/) 146(43 .4(3) 92(27 .4 % ) Visayas 363 24 (6 .6 9) 95 (262 7) 131 (36 .1(3) 113 (31 .1'3 ) Mindanao 433 (7 .0 (k) 6 (14 .0 3) I3 (30 .2%) 21 (48 8 Total 742 3 (5 .3 `7r) 18 (25 .2 p lc) 290 (39 .0`7c) _ 226 (30,5'3) 'liable 2 . Status of Philippine Coral Reef s .Source : Gomez et al . . Status Report on Coral Reefs of the Philippines 1994 , Proceeding Thir d ASEAN-Australia Syanpo,sium on Living Coastal Resources, Vol .] : Status Reviews (AIMS , Townsville . 1994 ) Environmental Concern s Environmental concerns include the maintenance of the ecosystem, natural lif e support systems, and the social and cultural conditions that impact on individual an d community well-being . " Because of the unbridled exploitation of natural resources fo r immediate economic gains, the critical balance of the ecosystem that sustains marine lif e from which people subsist is now in great peril . This is a trend mostly felt in the coastal an d offshore zones of developing states like the Philippines and unless immediate measures ar e implemented to arrest the rate of environmental degradation, the damage may becom e irreversible . Environmental issues such as oil spills, ship's ballast discharges, introduction o f exotic species and other sources of marine pollution are among the major concerns tha t merit serious attention . The increasing density of maritime traffic, especially that of large tankers carrying dangerous or hazardous cargoes in Philippine waters, has increased the ris k of environmental damage or pollution as a result of collision, explosion, fire, grounding o r other accidents . The threat is further aggravated by the possibility of accidental oil spills an d oil well blow-outs from the offshore oil exploration and recovery operations off Palawa n waters . Oil, in all its forms, from both ship and land sources, accounts for only 20 percent o f maritime pollution, and ship discharges only 7 percent (Figure 2) . 25 3 3 Figure 2 . Sources of Marine Oil Pollutio n The deterioration of marine water quality, particularly in coastal areas, bays an d inland waterways, due to pressures of urban development and increased human settlemen t poses a more serious threat . The impact of declining water quality threatens the use o f coastal and marine areas for recreation and commercial activities . Current pressures includ e untreated sewage discharges, direct sea dumping of garbage, agricultural wastes and toxi c substances such as pesticides and non-organic fertilizers, industrial discharges, factor y effluents and increasing beach and litter pollution . It is interesting to note that based o n data gathered over time, combined land sources account for more than 9(1 percent o f maritime poliution .2 1 Implica ti ons ofLOS C While there has been determined efforts by the Philippine Legislature to ratify th e adoption of the provisions of the 1992 LOSC which affirms the twelve nautical mile Limit o f the territorial sea and accords sovereign economic rights over the 200-mile EEZ, there i s still lingering debate that, as a result of ratification, the Philippines will have to surrender it s claim over a larger expanse of territorial waters (about 230,000 square miles) as stipulate d under the 1898 Treaty of Paris when Spain ceded the Philippines to the United State s (Figure 3) . ' ' However, because of the promise of immense economic benefits from th e exploitation of offshore resources and the growing global acceptance of the LOSC, it i s inevitable that Philippine maritime boundaries will be clearly demarcated in accordance wit h the provisions set forth in the Convention (with reference to the baseline, territorial limit s and FEZ as defiled in Republic Act Nr . 5446 and Presidential Decrees Nr . 1596 an d 1599 2' ) . To do otherwise will result in isolation from neighbouring countries . ® ACCIDENT S n SPILLAGE S q BALLAS T 0 DRILLIN G IB REFINER Y SEEPAG E 10%  3% 1 %  ® FALL-OU T O LAN D SOURCE S 41 % 34 hantou  T'oi- n (Shan-i'uu) -KOO = ong Kon g (Portugal) (United Klnlgdom) , ,~~ra Isle ~ dP  /S star Cha : & e1 i AN DAa -xa  f  S A, A L P gq $ Q 01 R t .UZON  SE A  m  , ` d . . atandu?nes M HLP DAN A iS p * •000 Baseline (Republic Act 3046 as amended by RA 5446,S-61 ) Treaty of Paris 1898/ Kalayan Claim (Presidential Decree 1596, S-78 ) 200 NM EEZ (Presidential decree 1599, S-78)/Line of Equidistanc e Figure 3 . Philippine Maritime Areas 35 Another related issue arising out of the promulgation of the LOSC is the designatio n of archipelagic sea lane passage . While the Convention confirmed the archipelagic state' s sovereignty over waters within archipelagic baselines enclosing all the islands, this exercis e of sovereignty is perceived to have been diminished with the inclusion of provisions o f transit passage of foreign vessels through designated sea lanes . While at least two possibl e sea lanes are being considered, namely the maritime routes from Surigao Strait to Balaba c Strait and East of Sibutu to West Mindoro, the Philippines has yet to officially designat e these sea lanes . A third route, from San Bernardino Strait through the Verde Islan d Passage, has been suggested by the Americans : this being a route suitable for nuclea r submarines . The Philippines object to this proposal as it is considered too close to Manila ' the country's seat of government and center of population . It should be noted that th e Convention stipulates that if no archipelagic sea lane passage is designated, sea lane passag e by foreign vessels may be exercised through all the routes normally used for navigation . Consequently, this translates to a wider area to monitor, this requiring more resources fo r the conduct of surveillance operations . The declaration of an EEZ and continental shelf by the Philippines, however, implie s that it is prepared to invest in the infrastructure . equipment and operation of offshor e surveillance facilities and platforms to exploit the benefits and meet the attendan t international obligations . One of the most important principles of the LOSC is that th e rights and obligations for which it provides must be accepted by participating states as a n integral package . When declaring their jurisdiction, coastal states cannot claim right s without incurring the obligations involved . ' This means that a state which accepts the right s conferred by the LOSC is obliged to conduct marine research, enforce conservatio n measures and manage the resources within its zone . To derive the maximum economi c benefits from its EEZ_ and at the same time fulfil its international obligations, the Philippine s must therefore possess a capability to effectively manage and police its coastal and offshor e estate . Table 3 illustrates, in summary, the varied tasks and potential benefits that could b e derived from the exercise of sovereignty over the EEZ . The Need For A Maritime Surveillance Capabilit y Background on Maritime Surveillanc e Professor Anthony Bergin, a noted Australian expert on the Law of the Sea, ha s identified five areas in which government must establish control . These areas are : th e management of marine resources, the maintenance of territorial integrity, the protection an d preservation of the marine environment, the prevention of illegal activity, and the safety o f life at sea . He has further noted that in order to achieve this control, the coastal state mus t be capable of three basic tasks: surveillance, monitoring and enforcement . '' Maritime surveillance, monitoring and enforcement refers to the systemati c observation and monitoring of an area in order to detect violations of specific rules and t o deter violations of those rules. In order to demonstrate a nation's resolve and capability t o exercise control over its sovereign territory, there must be a real expectation that th e breaking of the rules within the nation's maritime domain will be discovered and punished . 36 To create such an expectation requires a surveillance system that is perceived as bein g capable of both detecting and apprehending offenders on a regular basis . ` ' Task  Potential income from Potential benefit from  Cost s Fisheries License fee s Fine s Processin g Employment Stock conservatio n Ftxxl suppl y Export s Health benefits Surveillance vessel s aircraft & radio link s HQ admin & mgrnt cost s Customs due s Fines Drug enforcemen t Law enforcemen t Health benefits Same as for fisherie s Anti-smuggling Fines Law enforcemen t Accident prevention Same as Ior fisherie s nti-pirac y Navigation Aids Light dues Trad e Safety of navigatio n Accident prevention Traffic contro l Radar s Lighthouse s Beacon s Buoy s Survey vessel s Admin & communication s Hydrography Harbour due s Chart sales Safety of navigatio n Accident prevention Survey system s Chart production & administratio n Life savin g marine sport s Leisure Same as for fisherie s one by internationa l conventio n earch and rescue Fisherie s Fish funnin g Marine tourism & leisure Monitor vessel s Aircraf t Remote sensin g Communication s Emergency and clean - up equipment an d material s Fine s Compliance lie s Marine pollution , prevention , monitoring . control and clean-up Table 3 . The EEZ Balance Sheer " If these tasks arc not carried out effectively, the potential benefits may become a loss, wit h serious effects on trade, fisheries, loss of life, etc. The cost penalty is difficult to quantify . Surveillance may be categorised into two broad categories, military and civil . Th e aim of military surveillance operations is to provide information for intelligence purpose s and to provide combat information to a commander to assist in the decision makin g process . '" The areas of interest for military surveillance are often more general and les s defined than those for civil surveillance and are not limited to the offshore zone and th e E[Z but extend to strategic areas outside these boundaries . The auras of civil surveillanc e on the other hand, are similar to those of military surveillance as far as maintaining a n awareness of activity in the area of interest is concerned, however, it is generally mor e 37 focussed in area and target, and is subject to more precise customer requirements than th e military is in peace-time . Areas of interest are clearly defined, but may also change wit h seasonal and customer requirements ! It may be worthy to note however, that in the case of the Philippines, because of th e limited number of assets available and budgetary constraints, both military and a grea t extent of civil surveillance are concurrently undertaken by the Armed Forces in support o f civil agencies . An effective maritime surveillance system is deemed essential for the defence of th e littoral and the efficient exercise of sovereignty in internal waters, the territorial sea, and th e EEZ . It requires the coordination of civil and defence assets (See Annex A : Moder n Surveillance Equipment and Technology) to provide systematic observation of the country' s maritime areas of interest . Such a system is necessary to maintain a high degree o f awareness on what is happening in the maritime territories and ocean approaches . It is a vital tool to assess a particular situation, to collate and fuse data from a wide range o f sources, to disseminate the information by timely and secure means to the decision maker s or cognisant agencies, and to be able to appropriately respond to any contingency . Surveillance in areas of disputed ownership serves to demonstrate an ongoin g commitment and political will of the State to protect its interests in that area, and to gathe r information concerning the activities of other parties with competing claims . If it fails t o observe even a small unusual movement in its maritime areas and promptly act on it a s needed, then sovereignty and security are unduly imperilled and prestige adversel y diminished . This was proven by the incident in the South China Sea in early 1995 whe n Philippine authorities failed to detect that Chinese nationals had occupied and erecte d structures in the Mischief Reef 's off the coast of Palawan, virtually declaring thei r ownership of this Philippine-claimed territory . Current Effort in Maritime Surveillanc e The Philippines, being a maritime nation . has a number of distinct agencies wit h mandated regulatory responsibilities that are either devoted to or related to the effectiv e management and protection of sovereign ocean and waters, mostly in support of maritim e constabulary functions. Among the major stakeholders are : ▪ Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Department of National Defence (DND ) ▪ Philippine National Police (PNP), Department of Interior & Local Governmen t (DILG ) ▪ Bureau of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Department of Agriculture (DA ) • Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR ) ▪ Department of Transportation & Communications (DOTC ) ▪ Bureau of Customs (BUCIJS). Department of Finance (DOF ) Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) . Department of Justice (DOJ ) Under the current system, most of these each agencies carry out their ow n monitoring and surveillance over the maritime areas relative to their specific interests . However, the largest part of the surveillance and response operation is being undertaken b y 3)) the Armed Forces of the Philippines with its Navy and Air Force, under the aegis of th e DND (which is the major provider of surveillance resources for both routine and respons e surveillance activities), at the forefront . The Philippine Air Force (PAF), primarily through its 221' " Airlift Squadron , provides maritime air surveillance support to the AFP and other government agencies . I t uses two types of aircraft, the Aero Commander and the Fokker RF-27M which ar e equipped specifically for the conduct of surveillance operations, however, the full capabilit y of these assets has not been utilised due to some logistical support problem~ . '' In addition , other types of aircraft are occasionally employed for surveillance missions as deeme d necessary . For a five-year period from 1992 to the first quarter of 1997, the Air Forc e conducted a total of 673 surveillance sorties mostly in the Kalayaan Island Group are a logging a total of 1,109 .7 hours flying time " ; roughly an average of 220 hours annually . This figure, however, compares dismally with that of other countries, for example Australia , which, with an EEZ about five times larger than that of the Philippines, conducts abou t 14,0(10 hours of civil aerial surveillance (excluding military surveillance flights) annually .3 4 Therefore, over the same expanse of maritime area, Australia undertakes about 2,800 hour s of aerial surveillance annually compared to the Philippines' 220 hours . While aircraft can patrol larger areas and respond more quickly over greate r distances, a surface platform or vessel is required to make contact with the target vessel i n order to investigate, board and effect an apprehension, if necessary . A balance betwee n aircraft, surface ships and land-based sensors is therefore needed to provide operationa l flexibility . Thus, the Navy through its fleet and coast guard units conduct regular barrie r patrols of the territorial waters and some portions of the EEZ as part of its Constitutiona l mandate to safeguard territorial integrity and sovereignty . The Navy currently employsa number of fast patrol craft and patrol gun boats for policing the internal and territoria l waters while a handful of larger platforms, such as offshore patrol vessels, are tasked t o operate in the outer fringes of the EEZ . Between 1992 and June 1997, the Navy's assistance to other government la w enforcement agencies resulted in the apprehension of 755 people for smuggling, 5,53 6 people engaged in illegal fishing, 120 people for illegal possession of firearms an d explosives used in destructive fishing methods, 12 people for illegal drug trafficking, 82 6 people for illegal logging and 905 foreign nationals for illegal entry . Additionally, abou t 1,998 sea craft were apprehended and 1,294 firearms and 47,356 rounds of ammunitio n amounting to P629 .54M confiscated . 3 5 To augment its mobile surveillance assets, the Navy also operate and maintain a maritime surveillance network or coastwatch system consisting of land-based monitorin g stations in various strategic locations, particularly along choke points and sea border zones , to monitor the movement of vessels transiting these sensitive areas . Four Coastwatc h Stations have been established and these are located at : Cape Melville in Balabac, Palawan , in the West; Lower Calarian, Zamboanga, in the South; Capul Island, Northern Samar, i n the East : and San Miguel, Zambales, in the Northwest (Figure 4) . These facilities ar e equipped with micro-wave surface surveillance radars, radio direction finders and variou s types of communication equipment . The Navy intends to establish at least another fou r CWS within the next five years as part of its capability development program (See Annex B : Prospects in Surveillance Hardware Acquisition) . 39 Another major participant in the government's surveillance effort is the Maritim e Command (MARICOM) of the PNP . Its primary function is to prevent and suppres s violators of maritime laws, rules and regulations within municipal waters (the area up to 1 5 kilometers from the shore ' and assist in search and rescue operations in times of disasters . MARICOM currently employ several catamarans and other small sea craft in the conduct o f its maritime patrol sorties within its area of jurisdiction . Another government agency with major maritime interest is BFAR under the DA . BFAR exercises responsibility for the administration of fisheries legislation concerned wit h the management and exploitation of fisheries and other aquatic resources within Philippin e waters including the 200-mile EEZ . It is principally responsible for the management an d protection of about 26 .5 million hectares of coral reefs in the coastal areas and some 2,14 5 fish species in 32 major fishing grounds . " It employs a number of indigenous watercraft fo r limited monitoring of fishing activities in coastal areas and research purposes . BFAR' s objectives in relation to maritime surveillance are : that fishing activities are carried out i n accordance with legislative provisions, agreements and administrative arrangements ; an d that the highest possible detection and apprehension rate of unlicensed and illegal o r destructive fishing operations is achieved . The DENR is responsible for developing and coordinating policies and administerin g national programs (eg . Coastal Environmental Program, Bantay Dagat, Conservation of Priority Protected Areas Project, etc .) including scientific research projects relating to th e conservation, management and protection of the environment and exploitation of natura l resources . To fulfil this wide range of functions, DENR employs specially-built marin e vessels, light helicopters and a number of indigenous watercraft . Due to the lack o f personnel and relevant expertise within DNER, actual operation of some of these assets i s currently undertaken by uniformed personnel from the AFP through special interagenc y arrangements . ' ' The BUCUS is another major stakeholder in the maritime surveillance effort . It s primary concerns involve revenue evaluations, prohibited imports and exports, includin g narcotic drugs and fauna, and other forms of smuggling perpetrated through Philippin e water approaches . BUCUS does not, however, operate air and surface surveillanc e platforms and relies on intelligence inputs from its operatives deployed around th e archipelago in addition to cooperative exchange of information with other government an d non-government agencies and international and foreign organisations (eg . Interpol , Diplomatic and Trade Attaches, etc .) through overseas liaison arrangements . BUCU S generally makes arrangements for response and enforcement operations ashore using thei r own resources but has to rely on the assets of the AFP and the PNP for special maritim e customs operations . Other stakeholders have no or very limited surveillance assets and facilities an d depend on the services provided by the AFP and the PNP . 40 .~fa 1111  S  k l1 . .II  . o  . Qyy  „  q fypu~?  hantou : ~ . .  (Shan t'ou)  Leo 51 R , .  - h J  tIM  ' . _ JIWAN, ./~  Y au  ( J ig f a l Portug ) / Sash ' 9 Qd m ) J C4  i and  ra GuZdnl < ' INAN/DAOi  l  S ~ AI-NAN Q , ,' SATANISLAND S . l ~I  EJyAN  ` S ' id  YI jII I F LL J SE A 1 "  'I t ` . -! . ,  j . y ' t  °-•  i, W ' - . , Calaudvene s -- .,' Istood - ILIPPIN E id  ..  / .,, PA T N A ;itl l Mm  11 J 4 `R1J 4 y r _ . F '~"ls~ourvq r) ,, ; NEGR6 , tip 1 } SPRATLYISLAND SI±` €t .~4 i ' • ~ _ r oo,` ~~ 4 DAN A ifwbnlu  Sand '■ r , ANAL N'iEGAWA  q  C oup  1p ,,,, Loon  ' fwdawr  KEPE1lAU 0op  -mu m _ y 4!  f (1  1 f / I (IWDONE t  v  i  ` KEPULAtI A sANcti#  +  t  ~ ;~/ tN -A '  R ~, • c r te = ., . Fgure 4 . ExistingCoastwatch Stations 4 Other Maritime Surveillance Model s The Australian Model ' ' The civil surveillance program in Australia is managed and coordinated b y Coastwatch using a combination of contracted civilian aircraft, Defence patrol boats an d aircraft and sea-going vessels of the Australian Customs Service for, and on behalf of, a t least eight client agencies (Fisheries, Customs, Quarantine, Environment, Police , Immigration, Foreign Affairs/Trade and Primary Industry) . Coastwatch is a semi-autonomous operational branch of the Australian Custom s Service and commenced operations in 1988 . It has a head office in Canberra and regiona l offices in Darwin, Broome, Cairns and a sub-center on Thursday Island in the Tones Strait . The Minister for Science, Customs and Small Business within the portfolio of the Ministe r for Industry, Science and Technology is responsible for its operation, however, the Nationa l Manager in Canberra is responsible for its day-to-day administration . The National Manage r determines the national direction and focus of surveillance efforts based on the prioritie s identified by its client agencies . The Regional Managers on the other hand are responsibl e for the direct coordination and control of the surveillance assets to address client priorities . It must be noted however, that Coastwatch is a service provider and does not determin e threat areas or determine client ' s surveillance interests . The client agencies remai n responsible for the development of threat assessments and surveillance requirements i n relation to their respective program objectives . These client generated assessments form th e basis of operational planning and the subsequent conduct of surveillance operations b y Coastwatch . Surveillance requirements are submitted by the client agencies through a forma l committee system - the Operations and Program Advisory Committee (OPAC) compose d of representatives from the major client agencies . OPAC convenes in Canberra every mont h to plan the Commonwealth ' s offshore civil surveillance program. Client organisation s submit bids for the use of resources and the Committee representatives finalise an d determine overall priorities for all taskings submitted . A network of Regional committee s assist the OPAC in the formulation of the national surveillance program based on th e requirements of the various regions . Coastwatch's operational area covers the Australian coastline, its offshore island s and the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) and EEZ surrounding these areas which amounts t o approximately 37,000 kilometers of coastline and an offshore maritime area larger than th e Australian mainland . To maintain an acceptable probability of detection against an unknow n threat, surveillance efforts are concentrated on identified priority areas with high a incidenc e of activities of interest to the client agencies. The Coastwatch program is focussed on a wide range of client concerns which include : drug importation : illegal immigration : foreign fishing activity : quarantine breaches ; flora/fauna smuggling : national and marine park/wildlife monitoring and protection : 42 Australian patrol boat HMAS Warrnambool 43 ▪ environmental protection in coastal/offshore areas ; • monitoring of historic shipwrecks ; an d • any other breaches of Commonwealth or related offences in coastal and offshor e areas falling within the capacity of Coastwatch to provide . The principal components of Australia's current surveillance effort are : ▪ visual and electronic aerial surveillance provided by civilian contracted fixed-win g and rotary aircraft ; • 250 hours of dedicated RAAF P3C Orion offshore patrol of the Exclusive Economi c Zone inaccessible to Coastwatch aircraft ; • 1800 days provided by Naval patrol boats (Fremantle Class) for civil-related , offshore surveillance purposes ; • complementary effort by Customs sea going vessels, particularly to provide a n operational response capacity for inshore sightings or incursions detected b y Coastwatch assets ; an d • capacity to charter or hire additional air or surface resources, if required . The majority of aerial surveillance is undertaken by general aviation contractors . Th e contracts can be described as 'turn key' operations whereby the contractor provides aircraf t and aircrew together with the administrative and engineering support to meet Coastwatc h requirements . The training of observers however is undertaken by Coastwatch . The annua l cost of these contracts in 1994 was A$27 .23M consisting of A$26 .4M for fixed win g surveillance and A$0.83M for helicopter surveillance . All operational funds for civi l surveillance are directly budgeted for, allocated to and managed by Coastwatch . In broa d terms, these funds (A$35 .2M for FY1997) cover : • the costs associated with the contracted aircraft ; the costs associated with chartering additional general aviation and marine assets ; an d the administrative costs and salaries of Coastwatch staff . The cost however of operating the RAN Fremantle Class patrol boats and the RAA F P3C Orion aircraft (about A$34M per annum) for civil surveillance are presently borne b y the Australian Defence Force (ADF) through Cabinet direction . The Malaysian Model ' After Malaysia's declaration of the 2()(1-mile EEZ . on 25 April 1980, the Malaysia n government issued a directive (Prime Minister's Directive dated 6 October 1982 ) delineating the responsibilities of providing security in Malaysian waters as follows : Malaysian Territorial Waters (MTW) - Police (Marine and Air Wing ) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) - Navy assisted by the Air Forc e Although these two agencies play a major role in the surveillance and enforcemen t of law and order in the MTW and EEZ, the other enforcement agencies/department s (Fisheries, Environment, Marine Department. Royal Customs and Excise, and Immigration ) 44 continue to be fully responsible for carrying out their respective roles and function s pertaining to the enforcement of their relevant laws . Surveillance assets and manpower however were provided and operated by the Navy, Air Force, Police and Fisheries so tha t there was a need for a coordinated and effective scheme to optimise the utilisation of th e limited resources available . To address the problem of limited assets, the Maritime Enforcement Coordinatin g Center (MECC) under the Prime Minister's Department was created in 1985 throug h National Security Council Directive No .14 . Its objective was to coordinate the activities o f the various maritime law enforcement agencies and to ensure that the national asset s involved in maritime operations are utilised competently, swiftly and efficiently . As a coordinating agency, MECC is responsible for the formulation of standar d operating procedures to enable the various maritime enforcement agencies to operate jointl y when the need arises. To fulfil this requirement, MECC conducts various courses, dialogue s and joint operations on a regular basis . The MECC is headed by a senior naval officer and is comprised of 10 officers an d 23 supporting staff from the Royal Malaysian Navy, Royal Malaysian Air Force, Roya l Malaysian Police, Fisheries and Civil Service . The MECC is organised into five sections a s follows : MTW Section (headed by a Police Officer) ; Coordination and Operations Section (headed by a Fisheries Officer) ; EEZ Section (headed by a Naval Officer) ; Air Surveillance Section (headed by an Air Force Officer) ; an d Administration and Finance Section (headed by a civilian officer) . For effective operation, MECC is equipped with a range of communication facilitie s which include landline telephones, radios, facsimile and computers inter-connected with th e other maritime enforcement agencies . The Operations Room is manned 24 hours, thereb y ensuring an ability to respond quickly to any urgent matter . MECC however, has no maritime assets under its command or control . It depend s on the decisions made at the various committee meetings for the implementation of the maritime law enforcement requirement . It is not vested with legislative or executiv e authority to actively enforce maritime laws . The responsibility for enforcement is presentl y distributed to the various ministries and departments . As such, there are too man y controlling agencies and some agencies possess assets that could do much more but are restricted by law . The Indonesian Model " Maritime safety and surveillance in Indonesia is managed by BAKORKAML A (Coordinating Board for Maritime Security) which is an inter-agency body established i n 1972 by a Joint Ministerial Decree of Defence, Justice and Communication. It is responsibl e for security issues such as piracy, fishing intrusions by foreign vessels, trans-boundar y marine pollution and smuggling in offshore maritime areas. This organisation comes unde r 45 the Chief of Armed Forces who is assisted by the Chief of Naval Staff who has oversight o f day to day operation . BAKORKAMLA is based in the Armed Forces Headquarters i n Jakarta and employs a combination of patrol ships and aircraft from the Navy, Air Force an d the Police . Other government agencies with maritime-related concerns however assist th e Armed Forces in the national surveillance effort employing mainly patrol ships and boats . For efficient surveillance coverage of the entire maritime area of operations , BAKORKAMLA is divided into two Sub-Area Coordinating Centers (GUSKAMLA) . The Western Sub-Area Coordinating Center (GUSKAMLABAR) is based in Tanjung Pinang , Bintan Island and the Eastern Sub-Area Coordinating Center (GUSKAMLATIM) is base d in Ujung Pandang in the South of Celebes Island . Each Sub-Area Coordinating Center i s headed by a senior naval officer with a rank of First Admiral (Commodore) . The Sub-Area Coordinating Centers exercise direct control over the naval asset s based in their area of operations and coordinate with the nearest Air Force base for ai r support as required . The Western Fleet based in Jakarta and the Eastern Fleet based i n Surabaya provide ships and maritime patrol aircraft to both Sub-Area Coordinating Center s for continuos year-round operations . Both Fleets also maintain several forward bases fo r various strategic areas to support the logistic requirements of surveillance assets . The maritime patrol aircraft provided by the Air Force are managed b y BAKORKAMIA . It also decides on the scheduling of flights based on surveillanc e requirements from various military units. Surveillance assets however are readily attached t o the Sub-Area Coordinating Centers when there is an urgent need for these assets . Contribution to the surveillance effort from other government agencies i s coordinated through the conduct of regular committee meetings with the Armed Forces an d other concerned groups, however the responsibility for the enforcement of respective law s is presently distributed to the various government departments/agencies . Joint patro l operations are regularly conducted by the various government departments and the Arme d Forces and these activities are managed by the Sub-Area Coordinating Centers . There are also joint patrol operations with the naval and police forces from friendl y neighbours like Malaysia and Singapore in the Malacca and Singapore Straits in the Wes t and with the Philippines in the Celebes Sea in the East . Rationale For The Development Of A National Surveillance Structur e As evident from the foregoing discussions, the ability to protect and manage the Philippines ' extensive marine resources in the coastal and offshore areas is deemed vital to the nationa l economy. It requires the capability to monitor activities within those areas and to respond t o incursions . This capability is also necessary to protect the interests of national enterprise s and at the same time ensure that a just return is derived from others operating in thos e areas . Equally important, it provides a clear demonstration of sovereignty where maritim e boundaries are still to be resolved. It is unfortunate however, that the Philippines has yet t o develop what could be referred to as a "credible surveillance capability" to support nationa l efforts towards economic prosperity . 46 In spite of its inadequacies, it can be said the Philippines has a modest history i n maritime surveillance . The DND, through the AFP, is the dominant agency in the conduc t of maritime surveillance and enforcement operations (by virtue of its Constitutional mandat e to uphold Philippine sovereignty and integrity and at the same time preserve the nationa l patrimony particularly for defence and security purposes). Various government agencies an d other stakeholders in maritime affairs, are being assisted by the DND-AFP for thei r surveillance requirements particularly in the collection of information and the enforcemen t of relevant laws . This is understandable inasmuch as the DND-AFP is, at the moment, th e only government entity that is relatively well equipped with the relevant skills an d experience to conduct maritime surveillance . Maritime surveillance is an expensive undertaking and hence, a developing countr y like the Philippines must look at the most cost-effective means to carry it out . Sharing o r joint use of assets among government agencies is a recognised measure which is expected t o be cost-effective . However, with the amorphous surveillance structure and the apparent lac k of coordination among the stakeholders, national surveillance and enforcement tasks o n various maritime interests and regimes have been proven to be costly, inefficient an d ineffective . There have been attempts to integrate the surveillance requirements of variou s civilian government agencies into the defence surveillance program, however, most of thes e efforts were limited only to lateral arrangements between DND-AFP and one other agenc y (e .g ., DND-DENR), rather than pursuing a collective or multilateral approach . Othe r agencies, with their own interests in mind, sought to develop and maintain exclusiv e surveillance arrangements . This perpetuated the tendency among these agencies to compet e with each other, particularly with the DND-AFP, for a substantial share of the limite d national budget to sustain their respective surveillance activities . The AFP, through the navy and the air force, annually allocates patrol ship s steaming time and aircraft flying hours for surveillance and response operations, however , surveillance deployments do not actually follow any preconceived program or pattern . Th e time allocated for surveillance is determined by simply adding incremental increases to th e previous year's effort and is not based on validated patterns of activity or develope d knowledge of variations on the normal sea traffic (over the long term) that may be crucial t o security and economic well being . These allocations are done arbitrarily because there is n o comprehensive data-bank on which sound decisions can be based. This results in a numbe r of unnecessary visits to locations where the surveillance activity has relatively little or n o impact or provides no deterrent to any prospective adversary or intruder . Essentially , surveillance and enforcement needs to be seen as credible and effective in the eyes of thos e at whom it is targeted . These flaws give rise to an inefficient and very costly endeavour . Deliberate effort to concentrate surveillance assets to critical areas when and where they ar e needed most is therefore necessary and this requires good intelligence collection an d exchange, inter-agency coordination and interoperability ; all of which appear absent fro m the current arrangements . Maritime surveillance and enforcement operations have been conducted on an ad - hoc and sectoral basis in which sectorally based policies and strategies are generally applie d without coordination, and often without adequate consultation, resulting in economi c inefficiencies, conflict, duplication of effort, late responses and confusion about resourc e use issues . No single agency has total responsibility for any area . Many agencies and man y different user groups share responsibilities for most areas . It is apparent that a strategic an d 47 integrated approach is needed to allow the stakeholders to design a shared vision rather tha n competing with each other and duplicating activities . Notwithstanding the foregoing, a number of agencies were able to collect years o f invaluable data for their own purposes . Exchange of data between agencies has bee n encouraged, but too much effort is required to collect, collate and translate the data for it t o be widely useable. Data independently gathered by one agency and assessed as less valuabl e may be stored away without being shared, when it could be of significance to anothe r agency . This highlights the notion that surveillance systems are not merely concerned wit h the actual observation over a target area and collection of data, but equally, if not mor e importantly, the validation, analysis and communication of this data to aid formulation o f medium and long-term maritime strategy . In summary, the Philippines' current surveillance and enforcement regime for th e marine environment is characterised by : lack of an overall coordination mechanism or singl e administering agency ; fragmentation and overlapping of functions by a wide range o f government agencies ; a sectoral approach to surveillance and enforcement; unclea r demarcationof areas of responsibility ; and a primary response capability dependent upo n the priorities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines . The foregoing frailties in the Philippine maritime surveillance effort clearly suggest s that there would be certain advantages if it were managed and administered in a holistic o r integrated manner . On the other hand, the special interests of different governmen t departments in sectors related to the maritime sphere normally militate against having on e national authority for running the surveillance effort . As a sensible compromise, th e establishment of a coordinating mechanism (See Annex C : Proposed National Maritim e Surveillance Organisation) whereby officials from departments with major maritime interest s meet regularly to develop ways and means of working closely together is a viabl e alternative . Where practicable, cooperation can involve the sharing of assets, agree d common purchasing standards leading to interoperability of equipment (particularly in th e field of communications), the use of common training facilities and joint exercises t o prepare to meet disasters and other emergencies . Conclusio n The Philippines by its very nature, an archipelago composed of thousands of island s and islets surrounded by large bodies of water teeming with life and mineral resources and a population mostly settled in coastal areas, is essentially a maritime state . However, despit e this, the people, government policy, the economy and many aspects of social attitudes an d traditions tend to be insular and inward looking . The prevailing conservative attitud e towards the management and protection of the maritime environment and the resource s therein is manifested in the present predominance of an agrarian-based economy and th e poor state of the maritime environment caused by years of abuse and neglect . However , with the promulgation of the LOSC and the recent calls for a shift in development polic y that would emphasise the Philippines as an archipelagic state augurs well for a brighte r prospect in maritime-related programs . These circumstances make it all the more importan t 48 to preserve and manage what is left of the resources at sea and one inherent task to achiev e this end is to have what could be referred to as a credible maritime surveillance capability . While there are two broad categories of surveillance, military and civil, ultimatel y the objectives of both are the same; to maintain awareness and information dominance, a s well as provide a credible deterrence . The main difference however lies in their definitio n and the extent of their respective areas of interest . The military's maritime interests ar e more general in scope and extend to areas far beyond the EEZ boundaries, while civi l requirements are more focused on a definite area and target . Both civil and militar y surveillance however, is undertaken primarily by the Philippine armed forces under the Department of Defence and to a lesser extent the police force and other governmen t agencies . Compared to other surveillance models in place in many countries in the region, th e present surveillance effort is far from being cost-effective, efficient and responsive to th e prevailing needs of the present times . Aside from the apparent lack of funding an d inadequacy of appropriate equipment, facilities, infrastructure and technology, it i s characterised by a lack of coordination leading to economic inefficiencies, duplication o f effort among a myriad of government agencies, gaps in surveillance coverage an d inadequate or late response . What has been suggested in this paper is the establishment of an optimal means o f conducting surveillance over vast maritime areas of interest which must include a n appropriate level of coordination and control . Basically, the objective is to satisfy the civi l surveillance requirements of the participating agencies and at the same time to optimise th e use of the limited resources available . The proposed solution is for the establishment of a generic surveillance structure with the National Maritime Surveillance and Respons e Coordinating Office (NMSRCO) at its core . NMSRCO shall be tasked to coordinate, pla n and integrate all surveillance operations at a national level . The essence of the syste m would be an organisation that has the responsibility to develop and promulgate the nationa l surveillance plan based on the surveillance priorities of all concerned agencies while at th e same time being vested with sufficient authority to coordinate its implementation . T o provide the strategic level oversight and guidance, a strategic level committee which shall b e referred to as the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee (IAC) composed of senio r representatives from the participating departments, shall be constituted for the purpose . As to its financial requirements, the national surveillance program shall be treated a s a distinct and separate budget entity . This funding scheme is intended to maintain th e autonomy of the organisation such that it is not perceived as belonging to a specifi c department but, rather, is considered an agency that caters to the surveillance requirement s ofall participating agencies . Its funding should not lead to reduced funding for the othe r agencies' activities not directly related to surveillance . It is important to emphasise tha t NMSRCO shall undertake the administration, coordination and other managerial aspects o f the national surveillance program, while the participant agencies shall provide whateve r operational resources are available within their inventories . Finally, there exists a numberofpossible surveillance methods using several types o f platforms and sensorsofvarying costs and complexity . The choice of the most appropriat e solution however, would be dependent on a cost-benefit analysis, striking a balance betwee n 49 performance, cost and other factors such as value of assets being protected and th e consequence of inaction . The Philippines has a modest capability for surveillance an d enforcement using limited equipment of less sophistication but there are plans to enhanc e current efforts through acquisition of new equipment and sensors . The strategy o f procurement however should be an integrated one to optimise the limited resource s available . Notes : 1. Department of Foreign Affairs, Primer on the United Nations Convention on th e Law of the Sea, Republic of the Philippines, May 1991 . 2. Fortes M .D ., 'Marine Scientific Research in the Philippines: Status, Problems an d Prospects', The Seas Unite : Ma itime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, Sa m Bateman & Stephen Bates (eds.), CSCAP/Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defenc e No .118, 1996, p .113 . 3. Henry Albinski, The Australian-American Security Relationship : A Regional an d International Perspective, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1982, p .2 . 4. Justice Jorge Coquia, 'The UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) : Some Issues on it s Implementation', Navr .lournal, p .28 . 5. Michael Stankiewicz, 'Energy and Security in Northeast Asia' . An MCC Stud y Commissioned for the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue V, Energy Workshop Polic y Paper #35, February 1998 . 6. A . James Gregor, 'East Asian Stability and the Defence of the Republic of China o n Taiwan', Comparative St r ategy Vol . 16 Nr 4 1997, p .325 . 7. 'The Waters Beyond Mischief Reef', Financial Times, 15 March 1995 an d 'Mischief in the China Seas', Newsweek, 20 March 1995 . 8. Julian Baum and Matt Forney . 'Strait of Uncertainty ' , Far Eastern Economic ' Review, 8 February 1996, pp .20- I . 9. Al Labita, The Philippines, 'All the presidential men, Inside Asia', The Australian , p .32 . 10. Supra note 4, p .27 . 11. BFAR Final Report . 'Design and Implementation of a Monitoring Control an d Surveillance System for the Philippines: Phase 1', Primes Inc., Pasig City, March 1995 . 12. 1982 UNCLOS III (Article 61) . 50 l3 .  McManus, N .M . ,et al 1981 Survey of the Coral Reef Resources of W . Lingaye n Gulf . Philippines . 14. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, 1993 . 15. SUSTAIN Pre-Design Report, 1994 . 16. International Center for Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), Philippine s 1992 . 17. Gomez E .D . et al, 'Status Report on Coral Reefs of the Philippines 1994' , Proceedings Third ASEAN- Australia Symposium on Living Coastal Resources, Vol .I : Status Reviews (AIMS), Townsville, 1994 . 18. Supra note 9 . p .1t1 . 19. Carolina G Hernandez . 'Linking Development and Security in Southeast Asia : Concept Paper', Manila : Foreign Service Institute, 1952 . 20. James Bowen . 'Conservation and Pollution in the Maritime Environment : Politica l and Educational Issues', Australia's Offshore Maritime Interests, Occasional Papers i n Maritime Affairs :3, p.102 . 21. National Academy of Sciences Report, 'Petroleum in the Marine Environment' , 1973 . 22. Supra note 4 p .24 . 23. National Marine Policy, November 8, 1995 . 24. Supra note 4 p .24 . 25. Henriette van Niekerk . 'The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Se a 1982, Maritime Strategy for Developing Nations', South African Institute for Internationa l Affairs, p.100 . 26. Anthony Bergin, 'Introductory Remarks' in Anthony Bergin and Mohd Sidik Shai k Osman (eds .), National Coordination of Maritime Surveillance and Enforcement, ADSC , Canberra, 1995 po .2- 3 27. Australia's Offshore Maritime Interests, Occasional Papers in Maritime Affairs :3 , Australian Center for Maritime Studies Canberra, 1985, p .65 28. Commander M . F . Whelan, OBE, RN (Ret'd) and D . Offer, 'Optimising th e Opportunities offered by the Exclusive Economic Zones', EEZ Catalogue p . 24 . 51 29 .  Air Commodore J . McCulloch, RAAF, 'Concepts of Military and Civi l Surveillance ' , Polie'in , i, Australia's Offshore Zones, p .12 . 3(1 .  Ibid ., p.13 . 31. Supra note 5 : Adam Schwarz, 'Where Oil and Water Mix', Far Eastern Economi c Review, 16 March 1995, pp .54-8 . 32. Col Raul L Perez PAF(GSC), 'A Policy Options Paper for a Maritime Surveillanc e System', National Security Review, Vol . 18,1997 . 33. Presidential Management Staff, "I'he Philippines Today Pole Vaulting into the 21s t Century', Technical Report on the Accomplishments of the Ramos Administration . Jun e 1997, p .49 . 34. Australian Customs Service, 'Coastwatch : An Overview', September 1996 . 35. Supra note 3(1, p .5b . 36. Local Government Code (WC) of 1991 . 37. Supra note 9 . 3K .  1)ND ;DENR Memorandum id Agreement . Jan 13 199 5 39. Dux id Shackleton_ 'Command, Control and Communications ' . Managing an d Protectin, the Offshore Estate . Jack McCaffrie (ed . ), pp . 9(1-4 : Supra note 31 . 40. Dato' "I"uan Hashim bin "i'uan Moharnnrad . '1alaysia's Approach to Maritim e Enforcement ' , p 5-12 : 1-1ohd Sidk Shaik Osman . 'Surveillance Task: Malaysia n Perspective' . P .5-12, National Coordination of t'laritirne Surveillance and Enforcement , Anthony Bergin and Sidik Shaik Osman (eds .), ADSC, Canberra . 1995 . 41. Major SulistiyantoTNI, 'Safety and Maritime Surveillance in Indonesia ' . Maritim e Studies Period 98-1, 1IMAS Creswell . Mar 98 : Dr . Etty R . .Agoes, 'Policing Offshor e Zones, Indonesia's Model and Experiences' . Policing Australia's Offshore Zones : Problems and Prospects, Doug MacKinnon & . Dick Sherwood (eds .), Wolloongong Paper s on Maritime Policy No . 9, 1997, pp .176-86 . 52 ANNEX A MODERN SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY The resources and assets generally applied to maritime surveillance by the vas t majority of nations have not changed significantly in the past two or three decades . However, new systems (eg . satellite-based, unmanned aerial vehicles and over-the-horizo n radars) which offer longer detection range have been, or are being, developed and some ar e now in operation in countries like Canada, the USA and Australia, to name a few . Thes e new systems however, are very expensive to acquire and require substantial capita l investment for through life operation and support . Nonetheless, effective monitoring of the offshore estate can still be achieved by a judicious mix of fixed and mobile surveillance systems . The particular choice of surveillanc e methods and equipment would result from a trade-off analysis of factors such a s performance, cost, value of the assets to be protected and the perceived damage to nationa l interests of a failure to protect . The selection of the most appropriate combination o f surveillance systems is therefore a major issue in the establishment of a national maritim e surveillance system . There are numerous solutions available and each has its advantages an d disadvantages depending on the nature of the task . Some of the platforms and sensors (bot h new and old) currently employed for maritime surveillance are briefly described below . Fixed Array s Over-the Horizon Radar (OTHR ) OTHR operates in the HF radio band at frequencies between 5 and 32 MHz, an d relies on reflection of the radio waves from the earth's ionosphere on their path to and fro m the target . OTHR is used for broad or wide area surveillance since it is capable of range s 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers . It illuminates the target from above so that it is not possible fo r an aircraft to fly under the radar, as is the case with line-of-sight radar systems . It i s therefore suitable for detecting aircraft and ships . However, it is unreliable agains t submarines and occasionally against small surface vessels, particularly those with woode n hulls . Australia currently has an OTHR network in place which cost about A$970M . Surface Wave Radar (SWR ) SWR also operates in the HF radio band at frequencies between 5 and 12 MHz . Unlike OTHR which relies on reflection from the ionosphere, SWR relies on a techniqu e where electromagnetic energy or high frequency waves ' are propagated over the ocea n surface following the earth's curvature to detect and track targets beyond the horizon t o about to 500 kilometers . It can cover an area of up to 260,000 square kilometers . Lik e OTHR, SWR has the advantage that it is not possible for an aircraft to escape detection b y flying under the beam . The cost of an operational system is anticipated to lie in the range o f A$10-100M . 53 Land-based Microwave Radar (LMR ) LMR is a line-of-sight radar used for focal area surveillance . LMR is capable o f providing accurate information on surface and airborne targets . Its greater classificatio n capability is a result of its short wavelength (–3 cm) compared with the size of the object s being detected, and is based on Doppler modulation of the return beam due to the motion o f parts of the contact leg . propellers) . Basic target information obtainable from LMR include s size, range, bearing, speed, track, and in the case of aircraft, altitude . Classification o f surface targets may indicate target length, and whether the target is merchant or military . Airborne targets may be categorised as fixed or rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft may b e classified as propeller or jet . Jet driven aircraft may be further classified by the number o f engines, and differentiation, between an FA/18 and a Boeing 747 for example, is possible . The classification can be carried out at a range sufficient to enable a weapons system time t o react effectively . The radar range however is limited by the height of the antenna above se a level and its performance is downgraded by environmental factors such as sea clutter, rain , hail, sleet and snow . The cost per installation is estimated at A$ l M . Laser Rada r Laser Radar is basically a line-of-sight radar that operates by scanning a laser bea m across a field of view in a point-by-point fashion . Using signal processing techniques, dept h and range resolution suitable for target definition are obtained . Since it operates on line-of- sight principles, it thus suffer from the same inherent disadvanta g e that affects microwav e radar systems, that is an incoming aircraft can fly at low altitude to escape detection . Detection ranges of 100 kilometers are possible for aircraft . but adverse atmospheri c conditions can seriously degrade its performance . The cost of the system is anticipated to li e in the range from $200,000 to several million dollars . Bottom Mounted Sonar Array s Bottom Mounted Sonar Arrays are arrays of hydrophones mounted on the se a bottom which are increasingly used for oil exploration but may also be employed fo r surveillance . Unlike the surveillance systems described above, the sonar array offers a potential for detecting and classifying sub-surface targets and this can be carried out a t substantial distances . Fixed sonar arrays are estimated to cost from A$10-100M, dependin g on the capability desire d Aerial Platform s Fixed Wing Aircraf Fixed Wing Aircraft range from light aircraft with one pilot and maybe an observe r through to military long-range maritime patrol aircraft with crews of about ten . Because o f the slow flight and good manoeuvrability characteristics of light aircraft they are normall y used to search visually for signs of a landing along the coastline . The larger, more capabl e and longer range aircraft are employed to search a large open ocean area . Australia, fo r example, utilises Britten Norman Islanders for visual surveillance of its northern coastlin e 54 while the P3C Orion aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force are deployed to monitor th e vast expanse of their Southern waters including the Australian Antarctic Territory . Helicopter s Helicopters offer the distinct advantages of being capable of conducting boardin g operations, hovering and landing at isolated locations. However, they are generally mor e expensive to purchase and operate than equivalent fixed wing aircraft and have reduce d range, speed, operating altitude, endurance and payload . Satellite Mounted Surveillance Senso r Satellite Mounted Surveillance Sensors have the advantage of high operatin g altitudes and consequently ,wide area coverage . They would have to be in low earth orbi t (LEO) however, either in an equatorial or polar orbit, in order to be effective fo r surveillance purposes . The cost of a LEO system would be in the order of A$250M for th e first satellite and ground facilities and A$50M for each additional satellite . Tethered Balloons or Lighter-than-Air Platform s Tethered Balloons or Lighter-than-Air Platforms are basically a platform fo r microwave surveillance radars and other line-of-sight sensors (eg . 1R/Daylight camera , COMINT systems, etc .) . It offers the advantage of longer range because of the altitud e attained . For instance, a land-based microwave radar, because of altitude limitations, woul d only have a radar range of up to 17 nautical miles . Mounting the same radar to a tethere d balloon operated at an altitude of 3,000 feet would increase surface coverage out to 7 0 nautical miles giving track area of more than 14,000 square miles . Surface and Sub-surface Platform s Surface Vessel s Surface Vessels range from small patrol craft with shallow draft and suitable spee d up to the large offshore patrol vessels with superior sea keeping and endurance abilities . The small patrol craft are usually employed for near shore surveillance and response usuall y in benign and shallow waters . The larger and more capable offshore patrol vessels of up t o 1300 tonnes and capable of helicopter operations are deployed to patrol the rough portion s of the economic zone not accessible to smaller vessels . Submarine s While not generally classified as surveillance platforms, the utility of submarines fo r such purposes can not be overemphasised . Their ability to stay in an area over long period s and remain undetected offer a considerable degree of deterrence to would be intruder s especially if the latter is aware of the likelihood of detection and neutralisation by unsee n forces . 55 Command, Control and Communications System s Maritime surveillance may be undertaken by a combination of the means describe d above . It involves numerous interdependent activities which have to be planned . directed , coordinated and adapted to suit the circumstances at the time . In its simplest form, this i s achieved practically by a commander applying his authority and exercising command an d control through a communications system that collates the information from differen t sources and produce a coordinated surveillance picture . The hardware needed to link an d integrate all surveillance systems would include but not necessarily be limited to : satellite communications ; radio communications (HF, VI IF, UHF transceivers, etc .) ; computers with modems ; tactical data link integration systems (e .g . Link I I) ; an d multi-sensor fusion processors . Note : I .  Ross Barrett, `Fixed Arrays in Maritime Surveillance', Managing and Protecting th e Offsho r e Estate, Jack McCaffrie (ed .), Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995, pp .67-75 . 56 ANNEX B PROSPECTS IN SI!RVEII .I .ANCE HARDWARE ACQUISITIO N The Philippines has in its current inventory some of the surveillance equipmen t discussed in Annex A, but these are limited in both quantity and quality . Except for the 2 1 new 26-meter patrol craft made available through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the three 62-meter Peacock Class Patrol Vessels recently acquired from the United Kingdom , most of the surface platforms primarily employed for maritime policing and resourc e protection by the AFP are obsolete and have are very expensive to operate and maintain . T o enhance its present capability, the AFP, under its approved 15-year Modernisatio n Program, is pursuing the following maritime surveillance-related projects : • acquisition of offshore patrol vessels, patrol boats and patrol craft ; acquisition of long range maritime patrol aircraft ; • acquisition of multi-purpose helicopters ; ▪ establishment of more Coastwatch Stations ; • acquisition of air defence radars ; • acquisition of command, control and communications equipment ; an d acquisition of a mine warfare vesse l Other government agencies also have plans to procure equipment for th e performance of their respective maritime surveillance functions. These plans are summarise d in Table B I .  gency  quipment for Acquisition  mall craf PNP/DILG  Light Fixed wing Aircraf t  ight Helicopter  OTC  Search and Rescue Vessel s  uoy Tenders  mall craft (20-25 ft ) BEAR/DA  Patrol Craft (60 ft )  ommunications Equipment  able B I . Government Agency Equipment Acquisition s With independent plans to acquire equipment, it is necessary to consider eac h agency ' s program with reference to the total surveillance requirement in order to formulat e an integrated acquisition program to optimise the limited funds available and to ensure tha t there is a justified need for all the equipment being considered . 57 Philippine corvette RRP Pangasina n (Courtesy of R1r J . Slorrinne n 58 ANNEX C THE PROPOSED `NATIONAL MARITIME SURVEILLANCE ORGANISATION ' Purpose and Objective s The formation of the national maritime surveillance and response coordinatin g organisation will be a conscious decision to integrate the responsibility for surveillance o f Philippine waters under the auspices of a single entity . For the purpose of this paper, th e proposed organisation shall be called the National Maritime Surveillance and Respons e Coordination Office (NMSRCO) . The general purpose of the proposed NMSRCO is t o orchestrate all national surveillance requirements and to establish effective liaison wit h interested government agencies to assist them to achieve their corporate goals b y coordinating an effective surveillance program and response service in high risk, coastal an d offshore areas . NMSRCO's operational area shall cover the Philippine archipelago ' s interna l waters (within the baseline boundary), coastline, offshore territories (e .g ., Kalayaan Islan d Group) and the FEZ . The Organisation will have the following specific objectives : • To develop and maintain effective coordination and direction of national surveillanc e and response activities : to detect the presence of targets of interest within coastal areas and the 20 0 mile EEZ ; to respond to breaches or potential breaches of Philippine laws by raisin g alerts and coordinating response operations to meet the concerns o f participating agencies : to provide special assistance to search and rescue units ; and , to deter potential violations of Philippine laws . • With client input, to plan, coordinate and manage the effective use of resources fo r surveillance and response activities (in meeting this aim the NMSRCO shal l coordinate surveillance requirements and resources from the AFP, PNP, BFAR an d other agencies as appropriate, in a program of air, sea and land patrols, including th e resources necessary to undertake response action, including law-enforcemen t action) . To ensure, within agreed standards, an efficient and effective level of progra m performance is maintained . ▪ To maintain a timely operational information service . • To foster an informed, skilled and productive work force and provide a safe an d satisfying work environment . Organisational Structure 59 hhe NMSCRO will be organised as shown in Figure CI . Figure Cl. NNISCRO Organisatio n The NMSRCO's day to day administrative control and direction of the surveillanc e program will be exercised by a designated National Director within the DND-AFP . A n operations center which will provide a twenty-four hour centralised communications an d coordination point for all surveillance operations may be established and co-located with th e Joint Operations Center of the AFP . Although the office will be within the DND-AFP, i t will have a semi-autonomous authority and structure . The National Director at the Central Office will be responsible for : • determining national surveillance planning priorities : ▪ monitoring the operational effectiveness of the surveillance program ; an d • administering the overall financial aspects of the national surveillance program . While the National Director must be g iven executive responsibility, it would b e sensible to establish an advisory committee of major participants (Defence, Fisheries , Customs, Police, Immigrations . Environment and Transportation) to create a regular foru m for joint surveillance requirements and advice to the NISRCO on matters such as : fligh t patterns, flight frequency . adequacy of response, joint intelligence and equipmen t development . With many Government maritime concerns, there is considerable need t o coordinate the efforts of the participants to obtain the best output . If the organisation is to work effectively as a single agency supplying a joint servic e designed to satisf} the needs of the various government agencies with maritime interests, i t is vital that it he perceived as autonomous and not "belonging" to any specific participant o r INTER-DEP T ADVISOR S COMMITTEE CENTRAL ( )FFIC E NATIONA L DIRECTO R ADMINISTRATIV E DIVISION PLANNIN G LIAISON OPERATION S CENTRE REGIONA L OFFICES client . This can only be achieved if the organisation is not administered or controlled by on e of the major users or participants . There will be oversight and advisory committees that wil l be formed to promote cooperation among participating departments . In this regard, a multi - tiered approach consisting of the following components will be adopted : Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CCMOA) - this is an existin g committee created under Executive Order No . 186 which is tasked to formulat e practical and viable policies for the implementation of the UNCLOS and othe r marine related matters . NMSRCO Interdepartmental Advisory Committee (IAC) - this is a multi-agenc y body, consisting of the senior representatives from the participating departments , which provides a forum for discussion on surveillance cooperation and developmen t and makes appropriate recommendations. One essential role of this committee is t o keep interdepartmental arrangements under review, oversee the effectiveness of th e surveillance program, approve the yearly surveillance program as well as strategi c plans and provide advice to the National Director . This committee may conven e biannually or as required . NMSRCO Operations and Program Advisory Group (OPAG) - consisting o f cognisant representatives from participating departments/agencies . This workin g group provides input to the monthly surveillance program, reviews activities , prepares the yearly surveillance program, formulates and updates strategic plans fo r consideration by the IAC, and provides advice to the National Director o n operational and administrative matters. This group meets monthly . NMSRCO Regional Coordination Meetings - to be chaired by the National Directo r with membership consisting of Area Directors and regional representatives o f different departments . The purpose of the meeting is to provide regional input int o the surveillance program and to request special operations of value to the regiona l representatives . Issues considered are relayed to the OPAG for discussion an d inclusion in the national surveillance program . To aid effective liaison with their major clients, the NMSRCO shall establish it s operational headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Three Division Chiefs shal l report to the National Director . Their responsibilities will be divided between operationa l matters and administrative matters . The key organisational elements in Central Office are : an Administrative Division, which provides financial and general support t o NMSRCO ; the Planning and Liaison Division, which oversees the development and compilatio n of the national surveillance plan ; an d the Operations Coordination Center which provides a twenty-four hour centralise d communications and coordination point for all surveillance and response operations . 61 Operational Concepts and Principle s Fundamental to the national surveillance program is the NMSCRO concept an d principles of operations . The concept of operations provides a statement of the desirabl e operational parameters for surveillance activities taking into account priority surveillanc e needs and anticipated surveillance needs . The overriding considerations in formulating th e surveillance concept center on a cost-effective solution to the significant geographica l difficulties and the specific types of targets envisaged in the area of operations . The NMSRCO's surveillance program is a national program under the direction o f the National Director . He controls and coordinates the surveillance program through a structure of Central and Regional Offices. Under this structure all operating procedure s apply nationally . NMSCRO is a service provider . It controls and coordinates the country ' s surveillance program on behalf of a range of client agencies . It must be pointed out that th e philosophy of the NMSRCO is to assist, wherever possible, the achievement of th e objectives of each client agency, and through the liaison process and joint intelligence effor t become a contributor to the efficiency and effectiveness with which these objectives ar e attained . As this process develops, it is expected that users will develop a proprietar y approach to the NMSRCO and in a real sense, perceive it as their own agency and no t someone else's . This service will be delivered through coordination of strategic and tactica l surveillance and response missions, utilising the resources of DND-APP, PNP-DJLG , SFAR and other maritime agencies. On the other hand, the various clients departments wil l effectively contract the NMSRCO to meet their surveillance requirements . For efficient coordination, provision must be made for liaison with the ke y departments . Contact officers should be made available at all times to ensure rapi d processing of information and initiating of any necessary responses . Likewise, th e establishment of a Joint Working Group comprised of representatives from the ke y departments is deemed necessary to facilitate exchange of vital information . In broad terms, the Central Office determines the national direction and focus fo r surveillance activities in accordance with priorities identified by client agencies, includin g that of the DND-AFP . Regional Offices are then responsible for the direct coordination an d control of the surveillance assets to address client priorities . The surveillance activities should be based on previously agreed priorities and a deliberately planned pattern based on quality intelligence . However, in order to ensur e program effectiveness, the pattern and frequency of surveillance operations must be flexibl e and should be readily adaptable to prevailing circumstances and available intelligence . Modifications in the program whenever proposed by any agency should be adequatel y justified and subsequently concurred by the members of the advisory committee . The NMSRCO does not determine threat areas or clients' surveillance interests . Each client or participant is responsible for the development of threat assessments an d surveillance requirements in relation to its program objectives . These client-generate d 62 assessments form the basis of the operational planning for, and subsequent conduct of , surveillance operations by NMSRCO . The surveillance effort shall be concentrated in the `right place at the right time' . This does not mean that surveillance assets are only launched when a specific or know n threat exists . Instead, NMSRCO will use client-generated threat assessments an d surveillance requests to plan surveillance through areas that have the best chance to achiev e satisfactory operational results . These areas change over time and are continuall y reassessed, in consultation with client agencies, so that all new or emerging threats can b e adequately addressed . NMSRCO will maintain a viable, level of system readiness in order to respond t o urgent client requirements . The system readiness is maintained through a flexible roste r system for surveillance assets and crew, careful assessment and planning of progra m changes and nationally relocating resources . Funding Schem e Maritime surveillance and response should not be viewed as an activity intende d solely for defence but also as a requirement to provide protection for the maritime resourc e base, and to enforce applicable laws . Among the foremost consideration in establishing th e NMSRCO is the economy of effort and resources . Given that the ideal surveillance `force t o sea area' ratio is not achievable in the short term, `focus' and `impact' shall be the importan t elements in the conduct of surveillance operations . Equipment and cost sharing shal l characterise national surveillance and response activities (although most of the equipmen t and facilities can only be provided adequately by the AFP, PNP, DOTC and BFAR) . Thes e considerations can be best effected by having a distinct and separate organisation that woul d orchestrate and facilitate surveillance activities . For the NMSRCO to be considered as an officially designated organisation and thu s qualify as a budget entity, an Executive Order is necessary for its establishment . Th e NMSRCO funding requirements must be treated as a distinct and separate program t o preserve its autonomy (as is the case with the National Disaster Coordination Center an d the Mount Pinatubo Commission) . Maritime surveillance should be regarded as a program in its own right, and not a s an input to other programs . However, the NMSRCO does not intend to gather al l surveillance funds from the participant agencies and lump it together into one fund . Th e NMSRCO shall only require funding to sustain the administrative and managemen t requirements of the Central Office and its Regional branches, including an establishmen t fund for the acquisition of command, control and communication equipment . NMSRC O shall not maintain big-ticket surveillance equipment but will have access to the facilities an d equipment of the participant agencies . Capital outlay and pertinent operational requirement s shall remain the responsibility of the participant agencies and thus remain part of thei r regular budget . In the process of programming for the annual budget (see Figure C2), the CCMO A shall issue policy guidance pertaining to the national surveillance program as it relates to th e 63 national maritime objectives/interests for a specified calendar year . The NMSRCO-TA C translates the policy guidance into specific objectives which the OPAG uses to generate th e annual surveillance program and budget which are passed to higher authority fo r consideration . Figure C2 . National Surveillance Program & Budget Proces s Consequently, the participant agencies (especially the operators of surveillanc e assets : AFP, PNP, BFAR . DOTC, etc .), in accordance with the CCMOA policy guidanc e and following the NMSRCO annual objectives and national surveillance program prepar e their respective surveillance programs and budgets as items in their respective programs . I t is important to emphasise that NMSRCO shall support the administration, coordination an d managerial aspects of national surveillance, while the participant agencies shall support th e operational aspects of the assets in their in v entory . CCMOA POLIC Y GUIDANCE . NMSRCO-IA C OBJECTIVE S NNISRCOOPA L NATIONAL SURVEILLANC E PROGRA M NMRSCO NATIONA L SURVEILLANCE BUDGET PARTICIPANT AGENCIE S SURVEILLANCE BUDGE T NATIONAL SURVEILLANC E PROGRAM & BUDGE T IMPLEMENTATIO N 64 Merchant ship in the South China Se a rCrimvesr of 9' It in . ! : Rural Auorraliun At I orcel 65 Defence Publishing Servic e DPS : 34117/98